CASE COMMENTARIES
ANTITRUST
An agreement that deprives the marketplace of “independent centers of
decisionmaking” may be an unlawful restraint of trade under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
By N. Adam Dietrich II
Since being organized in 1920, the National Football League (the “NFL”) has
become the nation‟s most successful professional sports league and a lucrative multi-billion
dollar business. The NFL is comprised of thirty-two separately owned teams, each
controlling the use of its name, colors, logo, and related intellectual property. While these
teams are fierce competitors on the field, some cooperation is necessary off the field for
things like promoting the game and competing with other professional sports leagues. This
interplay of competition and cooperation presents some interesting issues in light of section
1 of the Sherman Act and was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in American
Needle, Inc. v. National Football League. Specifically, the Court considered whether the NFL
and its thirty-two teams were considered a single entity for antitrust purposes or whether
they were “separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests.” In the end, the
Court held that the teams could not be considered a single entity and that their arrangement
to collectively license their intellectual property rights constituted concerted action in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Prior to 1963, each team in the NFL managed its own intellectual property rights.
In 1963, however, the teams formed National Football League Properties (“NFLP”) to
develop and license their intellectual property as well as market their trademarked items,
such as caps and jerseys. Most of the revenue from this arrangement was shared equally
among the teams. For nearly forty years, NFLP granted nonexclusive licenses to many
vendors, including petitioner, American Needle, Inc. (“American Needle”), permitting them
to manufacture and sell apparel bearing team names and logos. In December 2000,
however, the teams authorized NFLP to grant exclusive licenses. Thereafter, NFLP granted
an exclusive ten-year license to Reebok International (“Reebok”) for the manufacture and
sale of trademarked headwear for all thirty-two teams.
After NFLP declined to renew American Needle‟s nonexclusive license, American
Needle filed suit in federal district court alleging that the agreements between the NFL, its
teams, NFLP, and Reebok violated sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Finding for the
defendants, the district court concluded that in regards to licensing the teams‟ intellectual
property, “they have so integrated their operations that they should be deemed a single entity
rather than joint ventures cooperating for a common purpose.” The court of appeals
affirmed, focusing on the fact that football itself can only be carried out jointly. The court
noted that the teams “share a vital economic interest in collectively promoting NFL
football.” As a result, the court concluded that the teams function as one source of
economic power and are not subject to section 1 of the Sherman Act.
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court first looked at the language of section
1 of the Sherman Act, which makes illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of a
trust or otherwise, or, conspiracy, in restraint of trade.” The Court noted that not every
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instance of cooperation between individuals is illegal under the Sherman Act; rather, section
1 only applies to concerted action that restrains trade. The Court explained that, unlike
independent action, Congress was weary of concerted activity because it “deprives the
marketplace of independent centers of decisionmaking that competition assumes and
demands.” In determining what qualifies as concerted action, the Court stated that the
parties involved do not have to be legally distinct entities. On the other hand, just because
there is more than one legally distinct entity involved does not imply that there is concerted
action. The Court proffered that the key is whether the alleged “contract, combination . . . ,
or conspiracy” joins together “separate economic actors pursuing separate economic
interests.” Moreover, the Court determined that where two legally distinct entities have
organized themselves under a single umbrella or into a structured joint venture, courts will
look to substance over form to determine whether the agreement joins together
“independent centers of decisionmaking.”
Applying these rules to the facts in American Needle, the Court reversed and
remanded the decision of the court of appeals, concluding that the NFL teams “do not
possess either the unitary decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic
power characteristic of independent action.” The Court noted that each of the thirty-two
teams are independently owned and managed, their objectives are distinct, and they compete
with one another not just on the playing field, but in attracting fans, obtaining ticket sales,
and signing players to contracts. Furthermore, the Court indicated that the teams are
competing suppliers of their valuable trademarks, so when they decide to collectively license
these marks to a single vendor, they “deprive the marketplace of independent centers of
decisionmaking.” In regards to NFLP, the Court held that its decisions also constitute
concerted action under section 1 because it acts on interests separate from the interests of
the thirty-two teams, which actually own the share of jointly managed assets. Again, looking
to substance over form, the Court found that NFLP was simply a “formalistic shell” or
vehicle for ongoing concerted activity.
Additionally, the Court was not persuaded by the NFL teams‟ argument that they
constitute a single entity because, without their cooperation, there would be no NFL
football. The Court recognized that some degree of cooperation is necessary for the
economic survival of all professional sports leagues; however, this necessity of cooperation
does not change concerted action into independent action. As the Court noted, “a nut and a
bolt can only operate together, but an agreement between nut and bolt manufacturers is still
subject to [section] 1 analysis.”
Finally, while the Court held that the NFL teams could not be treated as a single
entity “when it comes to the marketing of the teams‟ individually owned intellectual
property[,]” it stated that the special characteristics of the industry would make many
agreements between the teams exempt from section 1 scrutiny. Specifically, the Court cited
the “Rule of Reason,” which states that certain joint ventures and other cooperative
arrangements are “not usually unlawful . . . where the agreement . . . is necessary to market
the product at all.” As an example, the Court stated that agreements for the production and
scheduling of games would be an acceptable type of concerted action in which the “Rule of
Reason” would apply.
In practice, the Court‟s unanimous decision in American Needle will have the largest
impact on sports agents and corporate attorneys representing players and professional sports
leagues, such as the NFL, NBA, and MLB. In regards to the ongoing NFL labor dispute,
the Court‟s decision should give the NFL players more leverage in dealing with the owners,
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who may face additional scrutiny when trying to implement league-wide policies such as
salary ceilings and an eighteen game season. Furthermore, intellectual property attorneys, in
general, should benefit as more vendors are permitted to manufacture and sell merchandise
bearing professional sports logos, resulting in a new source of revenue for the vendors, while
lowering the price of these goods on the market. Exclusive licensing deals for apparel,
television, and video games will face extensive antitrust scrutiny, and entities such as NFLP,
set up to manage the licensing rights of the teams, may become totally obsolete.
Furthermore, in the future, individual teams will likely make their own arrangements for
licensing their intellectual property and marketing trademarked goods. This result is good
for large market teams, like the Dallas Cowboys, but could harm small market teams, like the
Jacksonville Jaguars, who benefitted from the revenue sharing set up by NFLP.
In conclusion, while the effect of American Needle outside the professional sports
realm is uncertain, it is clear that any corporate attorney should be weary of agreements
between their client and rival corporations. Even for industries where cooperation between
competitors is necessary, so long as the agreement joins together two “independent centers
of decisionmaking,” courts may strike the deal for being an illegal restraint on trade. In sum,
corporate attorneys should always consider substance over form when determining whether
an agreement violates section 1 of the Sherman Act.

ARBITRATION
An arbitration agreement binds contractual parties to arbitration, even for threshold
issues, unless the challenging party specifically contests the provision within the
arbitration agreement that grants the arbitrator authority to determine the
agreement’s validity. Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
By Keshia L. Williams
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, the law of contracts applies to written
agreements to arbitrate matters of controversy. Hence, arbitration agreements are subject to
general contract principles relating not only to formation and terms but also to defenses
against validity. Typically, courts have authority to determine the validity of a contract‟s
arbitration provision if the challenging party contests the arbitration provision specifically,
rather than the contract as a whole. In Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, however, the
United States Supreme Court addressed whether this same rule applies if the contract itself is
an arbitration agreement. Following precedent, the Court held that, absent a specific
challenge to the provision within the arbitration agreement that grants an arbitrator authority
to determine the agreement‟s validity, the arbitrator, rather than the court, has authority to
decide the validity of the arbitration agreement.
In 2003, Antonio Jackson signed a “Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Claims” (the
“Agreement”) as a condition of his employment with Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. (“Rent-ACenter”). Two of the Agreement‟s arbitration provisions were relevant. The first, “Claims
Covered By The Agreement,” required arbitration for all “past, present or future” matters
related to Jackson‟s employment. The second, the “Delegation Clause,” gave the arbitrator
exclusive authority over “any claim that all or any part of [the Agreement] is void or
voidable.”
On February 1, 2007, Jackson filed an employment discrimination claim against
Rent-A-Center in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. Thereafter,
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Rent-A-Center filed a motion to dismiss and to compel arbitration under the Federal
Arbitration Act (the “FAA”). Rent-A-Center claimed that under the Agreement, Jackson
was required to pursue his claim in arbitration rather than in court. In response, Jackson
argued that the Agreement was unconscionable under Nevada state law. Rent-A-Center not
only questioned whether the court even had authority over the unconscionability issue but
also challenged the merits of Jackson‟s argument.
The district court found that Jackson‟s unconscionability claim referenced the
Agreement in its entirety and that the Agreement clearly gave the arbitrator exclusive
authority over enforceability. Therefore, the district court concluded that Jackson‟s
challenge was an issue for the arbitrator and, thus, granted Rent-A-Center‟s motion. On
appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the lower court on the issue of authority. Though the
Agreement delegated questions of validity to the arbitrator, the court of appeals found that
Jackson‟s claim of unconscionability negated his consent to that part of the Agreement.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit held that unconscionability was logically a threshold issue for
the court to decide.
On appeal, in a 5-4 decision, the United States Supreme Court held that
unconscionability is an issue for the arbitrator if the challenging party fails to contest the
specific provision within the arbitration agreement that grants the arbitrator authority to
determine the agreement‟s validity (the “delegation provision”). The Court glossed over any
consideration of the parties‟ intent and instead focused on which part of the agreement
Jackson challenged. The Court determined that the decision is for the arbitrator when the
question of unconscionability is based on the whole agreement and that the decision is for
the courts when the question is specific to the delegation provision.
In its analysis, the Court first looked to the FAA, which establishes both substantive
and procedural rules regarding arbitration agreements. Under the substantive rule of section
2 of the FAA, arbitration is a matter of contract law. According to the FAA, a written
agreement “to settle by arbitration a controversy . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable.” The Court noted that just like all contracts, arbitration agreements are subject
to invalidation by traditional contract defenses such as fraud or unconscionability. Citing
procedural rules established in sections 3 and 4 of the FAA, the Court explained that when a
written agreement requires that a certain issue be handled in arbitration, a party may request
a stay of federal litigation and may petition the court for an order requiring arbitration of the
matter.
The Court then explained that in the past, it had followed two rules regarding who
decides validity issues of arbitration agreements. First, gateway issues are decided by an
arbitrator when the delegation provision “clear[ly] and unmistakabl[y]” requires so. The
Court noted that courts decide this issue by looking at the parties‟ intent. Second, when a
party challenges the entire contract or a provision separate from the agreement to arbitrate,
the arbitrator decides validity.
The Court noted that as a matter of federal law, an arbitration provision is severable
from the rest of a contract; therefore, under the FAA, a contract‟s arbitration provision
remains enforceable if the challenging party contests another provision of the contract or
even the contract as a whole. In that case, the arbitration provision applies and the
arbitrator decides the validity of the questioned contract provisions. However, the Court
found that when the party specifically challenges the arbitration provision, the court, not the
arbitrator, determines the agreement‟s enforceability. Under these circumstances, the court
decides the validity before ordering compliance with the written agreement. Applying these
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principles to situations where the contract itself is an arbitration agreement, the Court held
that in order for courts to have authority to decide the validity of an arbitration agreement,
the challenging party must specifically contest the agreement‟s delegation provision.
Turning to the facts of the case, the Court found that Jackson only contested the
validity of the Agreement as a whole. In both his response to Rent-A-Center‟s motion to
dismiss and his appeal to the Ninth Circuit, Jackson failed to contest the validity of the
Delegation Clause in particular. Instead, he made repeated references to the Agreement in
its entirety. Furthermore, in his claim of unconscionability under Nevada state law, the
Court determined that Jackson failed to identify substantive challenges related to the
Delegation Clause. The Court concluded that Jackson argued for the invalidation of the
entire agreement without specifically identifying why the Delegation Clause should be void.
The dissenting opinion criticized the majority for failing to realize that an arbitration
agreement alone, rather than just an arbitration provision in a broader contract, should be
treated differently under the FAA. In particular, the dissent identified the oxymoron of
requiring an arbitrator to decide the threshold validity of the agreement to arbitrate. To
require the party to submit to arbitration is to enforce the agreement. In particular, the
dissent cited the first rule for arbitration validity by looking to the parties‟ intent. Like the
Ninth Circuit, the dissent found that Jackson‟s claim of unconscionability countered any
possible “clear and unmistakable” evidence validating the agreement.
The Supreme Court‟s decision to send issues of enforceability to arbitrators serves
as a learning tool to attorneys drafting arbitration agreements. For clients who want to
ensure arbitration, such as corporations and organizations, attorneys should include
delegation provisions when drafting arbitration agreements. The provision should explicitly
and clearly state that the arbitrator will resolve even gateway issues, such as enforcement or
validity. By requiring a challenge to the specific provision, parties who challenge arbitration
agreements in court will have a hard time making a case when a delegation provision is
present. However, for clients who want to challenge the validity of an existing arbitration
agreement, attorneys can overcome this hurdle and get into court by specifically challenging
the delegation provision rather than the agreement as a whole. Overall, the Court‟s decision
presents a very pro-arbitration stance, as it will lead to more cases being decided by
arbitrators than by courts. While the Supreme Court chose to follow its own precedent, the
close vote is a warning that attorneys should watch this issue in the future. Until then, the
success of arbitration agreements will depend on both the careful drafting of all-inclusive
delegation provisions and the specificity of challenges against such provisions.
In Tennessee, parties to an arbitration agreement may not agree to modify the scope
of judicial review beyond that imposed by statute, and the inclusion of such a
provision constitutes mutual mistake requiring rescission of the agreement. Pugh’s
Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Dev. Corp., 320 S.W.3d 252 (Tenn. 2010).
By Joshua S. McCord
In the state of Tennessee, as in many other states, the General Assembly has
enacted legislation to govern arbitration agreements between conflicting parties. By limiting
the scope of judicial review available to arbitration agreements, such statutes limit a trial
court‟s ability to retry issues decided in arbitration and reinforce the utility of arbitration as a
final resolution, thereby giving conflicting parties confidence and encouraging private
settlement through arbitration. Despite the existence of statutes governing arbitration

194

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 12

agreements, the rule regarding whether parties can agree to modifications of these provisions
has been ambiguous. In Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Development Corp., the Tennessee
Supreme Court addressed whether parties to an arbitration proceeding can agree to a scope
of judicial review different from that imposed by statute, ultimately holding that they cannot
and that the inclusion of such a provision constitutes mutual mistake requiring rescission of
the arbitration agreement.
The facts leading to Pugh’s Lawn Landscape began in March 2006, when Pugh‟s Lawn
Landscape Company, Inc. (“Pugh‟s”) filed a breach of contract suit against Jaycon
Development Corporation (“Jaycon”). Jaycon subsequently asserted a counterclaim for
breach of contract, and although the contract did not require the parties to submit to
arbitration, it did stipulate that Tennessee law would govern any arbitration or litigation
arising from that transaction. Early in the discovery process, the parties agreed to submit
their dispute to arbitration, and the trial court entered a consent order stipulating that the
arbitrator‟s judgment would be appealable under the same standards of review applied to a
judgment issued by a trial court. Thus, each party believed that they would have the right to
appeal the arbitrator‟s award. In arbitration, the arbitrator awarded Jaycon damages plus
reasonable attorney fees, court costs, and arbitration costs, and the trial court confirmed the
award upon Jaycon‟s motion after Pugh‟s failed to respond. Citing language in the consent
order that allowed either party to seek an appeal, Pugh‟s appealed, but the Tennessee Court
of Appeals held that the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act (the “TUAA”) limits the scope
of judicial review of an arbitrator‟s decision, and therefore, the parties could not simply
consent to expand the scope of this review. The court of appeals thus affirmed the trial
court‟s confirmation of Jaycon‟s award and subsequently denied Pugh‟s petition for
rehearing because Pugh‟s did not object to Jaycon‟s motion to confirm the award on the
basis of mutual mistake. The Tennessee Supreme Court, however, granted Pugh‟s
application for permission to appeal because neither party challenged the validity of the
provision expanding judicial review at trial court; rather, the court of appeals raised this issue
sua sponte during oral argument.
The TUAA, found in sections 29-5-301 through 29-5-320 of the Tennessee Code,
governs arbitration agreements, including the scope of judicial review to be applied to such
agreements. Specifically, section 29-5-312 prescribes that a court must confirm an
arbitrator‟s award except in two very specific instances, codified in sections 29-5-313 and 295-314. Under section 29-5-313, the court must vacate an award where the arbitration was
conducted fraudulently or unfairly, while section 29-5-314 provides that the court must
modify or correct an award in specific instances of mistake. Thus, in order to obtain judicial
review of an arbitrator‟s award under the TUAA, a party to the arbitration must move the
court to vacate, modify, or correct the award on the basis of one of these narrowly tailored
scenarios. In the absence of one of these scenarios, no judicial review is available, as the
court is bound to confirm the award and enter the judgment reached by the arbitrator.
Additionally, Tennessee law allows courts to rescind a contract for mistake when the mistake
is innocent, mutual, and material to the transaction and when the complaining party is
injured.
On appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court held that parties to an arbitration
agreement cannot simply agree to expand the scope of judicial review beyond that set forth
by the TUAA. Thus, provisions that purport to achieve such a modification are
unenforceable. Because the arbitration agreement between Pugh‟s and Jaycon included this
failed provision, and because both parties mistakenly believed that they were entitled to
judicial review of the arbitrator‟s award, the court also held that mutual mistake necessitated
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rescission of the agreement. Although the court of appeals also held that the parties could
not agree to expand the scope of judicial review, the Tennessee Supreme Court disagreed
that Pugh‟s had waived its right to challenge the validity of the provision. Thus, the
Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, vacating the trial
court‟s confirmation of the arbitrator‟s award and remanding the case to the trial court for
further proceedings.
For Tennessee practitioners, Pugh’s Lawn Landscape Co. v. Jaycon Development Corp.
clarifies the scope of judicial review available to parties to arbitration agreements. Although
parties may attempt to agree to a more expansive scope of judicial review than that
prescribed by the TUAA, such provisions will not be enforced, and the statute will dictate
the applicable scope of judicial review. Furthermore, the inclusion of such a provision that
attempts to expand the scope of judicial review will constitute mutual mistake and require
rescission of the arbitration agreement. While practitioners may utilize this standard to
reinforce the finality of a favorable arbitration award by preventing frivolous appeals from
opponents, they must also be careful not to rely on such an agreement to the detriment of a
client. Finally, practitioners must also remain cognizant of the possibility of forum
shopping, as some states explicitly allow parties to agree to expanded judicial review.

BANKRUPTCY
In a chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, the perfected status of a security interest in
collateral is not waived if the secured party surrenders such collateral after the
bankruptcy’s petition date. In re Cumberland Molded Prods., LLC, 431 B.R. 718 (B.A.P. 6th
Cir. 2010).
By Byron Pugh
Typically, if a secured party has a perfected security interest in a debtor‟s collateral,
the security interest survives a bankruptcy filing by the debtor, and the bankruptcy court
makes a determination regarding the priority of the security interest and the appropriate
relief owed to the secured party. In some situations, after bankruptcy proceedings have
commenced, a secured party in possession of collateral may, upon request from the
bankruptcy trustee, voluntarily surrender such collateral to the trustee. In In re Cumberland
Molded Products, LLC, the United States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel of the Sixth Circuit
examined whether such a voluntary relinquishment of collateral waives the secured party‟s
perfected security interest in the collateral. The court found that in a chapter 7 bankruptcy
proceeding, a voluntary relinquishment of collateral does not waive the secured party‟s
perfected security interest in the relinquished collateral.
The relevant facts of this case began in October 2007 when Cumberland Molded
Products, LLC (“Cumberland”) consolidated its loan obligations into a single $1 million
promissory note in favor of First National Bank of Woodbury (“Woodbury”). In the course
of issuing the promissory note, Cumberland entered into a security agreement granting
Woodbury a security interest in collateral, which, according to the security agreement, was
defined as “all equipment, machinery, inventory, tools, accounts receivable and all general
intangibles of [Cumberland] whether now owned or hereafter acquired, together with
substitutes and replacements thereof, all accessions, and accessories added to or used in
connection with such equipment.” Soon after, Woodbury perfected its security interest by
filing a proper financing statement.
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Cumberland also held a standard checking account at Woodbury, which it used to
deposit payments from various customers. On August 29, 2008 (the “petition date”),
Cumberland filed a voluntary petition for relief under chapter 7 of the United States
Bankruptcy Code. The balance of Cumberland‟s checking account on the petition date was
$455,655.66. Also on the petition date, Cumberland listed Woodbury as a secured party in
its schedules, and Cumberland had not defaulted on its obligations to Woodbury.
Subsequent to the petition date, the court appointed bankruptcy trustee (the “trustee”) asked
Woodbury to turn over the funds contained in Cumberland‟s checking account. On
September 12, 2008, Woodbury complied and deposited a check for $455,655.66 into the
trustee‟s account. Woodbury was aware that Cumberland was contemplating bankruptcy but
did not take any steps to freeze the checking account or set-off Cumberland‟s indebtedness
to Woodbury.
Instead, in November 2008, Woodbury filed a motion for relief from stay and
abandonment, seeking an order directing the trustee to return the funds contained in
Cumberland‟s checking account and any interest earned on the account. The trustee
responded by filing a complaint, seeking to determine the validity and priority of
Woodbury‟s alleged interests. Woodbury then filed an answer and a counterclaim, again
asking for relief from stay and abandonment. In response, the trustee filed an amended
complaint alleging (1) that Cumberland did not grant Woodbury a security interest in the
checking account; (2) that Woodbury‟s security interest was unperfected because Woodbury
did not maintain control of the collateral; and (3) that, as a transferee, the trustee took the
funds from Cumberland‟s checking account free and clear of any competing interests. On
May 29, 2009, the trustee filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a determination that
the funds transferred were the property of the estate and not subject to any perfected
security interest. A day later, Woodbury filed a motion for summary judgment, seeking a
judgment in its favor on all three allegations made in the trustee‟s amended complaint.
On July 21, 2009, the bankruptcy court issued a memorandum opinion in favor of
the trustee, finding that the checking account funds held by the trustee were property of the
estate, free and clear of Woodbury‟s unperfected security interest. On appeal by Woodbury,
the issue presented to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel was whether Woodbury lost its
perfected security interest in Cumberland‟s checking account funds by transferring the funds
to the trustee after bankruptcy proceedings had commenced.
In response to this issue, the court explained that a trustee may only exercise its
authority over property in the bankruptcy estate and that the determination of which claims
are perfected and secured by property in the bankruptcy estate is made as of the petition
date. Accordingly, if a secured party were to turn over, to a trustee, collateral subject to a
security interest, the secured party would not lose its perfected security interest in the
collateral simply because the secured party no longer possessed the collateral. The court
warned that ignoring this principle would elevate the trustee‟s interest against those who
properly perfected their security interests prior to the bankruptcy proceeding. Although
section 544 of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides trustees with powers similar to
that of judicial lien holders, the court noted that such powers are only conferred to trustees
after the “commencement of the case” and that section 544 does not “provide the trustee
with an interest superior to that of [secured parties] whose interests were perfected prior to
the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings.”
The court next rejected the trustee‟s argument that it was a transferee of the
collateral under section 9-332 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The court again noted that
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when a debtor files a bankruptcy petition, an estate is created in all of the debtor‟s property
as of the petition date. Therefore, in this case, because Woodbury transferred the checking
account funds to the trustee after the petition date, the court found that the funds were
included in Cumberland‟s estate and that the trustee could not be considered a transferee of
the collateral who took free and clear of any perfected security interests. The court also
found that the trustee‟s argument did not conform with the function of the free and clear
policy provided to transferees. As the court explained, the purpose for such a policy is to
prevent secured parties from extending their security interests to anything the transferee
purchases. Given the fact that the trustee gave no consideration for the transfer and had no
authority to purchase anything with the funds, the court determined that the post-petition
date check was nothing more than a delivery of funds already owned by Cumberland‟s
estate.
The court also found the trustee‟s statutory interpretation to be inconsistent with
public policy. For example, if a secured party faces the prospect of losing its perfected
security interest as a result of surrendering collateral, the secured party will be less willing to
surrender such collateral. This system would also create a strong distrust among trustees and
secured parties. Finally, the court determined that the policy interests concerning secured
and perfected claims are best resolved, not by waiving the perfected status of a security
interest, but through proper bankruptcy proceedings. Basing its decision on statutory law,
case law, and public policy, the court concluded that Woodbury did not surrender its
perfected security interest when it voluntarily turned over Cumberland‟s checking account
funds to the trustee.
With this decision in mind, secured parties can rest assured that when deposit
account funds or other collateral are voluntarily surrendered to a bankruptcy trustee after the
petition date, the secured party does not risk losing its perfected security interest. The
court‟s decision also protects the integrity of current relationships that exist between
bankruptcy trustees and secured parties. Preserving the integrity between secured parties and
trustees strengthens the ability of trustees to perform their primary purpose: “marshal[ling]
assets for the benefit of . . . [secured parties].” Also, the decision benefits current and
potential debtors alike; secured parties will be less averse to extending credit knowing that
their interest remains perfected following a turnover request from the bankruptcy trustee.

BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
In Delaware limited partnerships, general partners may not utilize federal privacy
regulations or partnership privacy notices to prevent the disclosure of certain
information to limited partners. Parkcentral Global, L.P. v. Brown Inv. Mgmt., L.P., 1 A.3d
291 (Del. 2010).
By Michael Franz
When hedge funds or other investment companies lose extensive amounts of
investor capital or fail altogether, investors may turn to litigation against the investment
company as a way to recoup those losses. The process of proving mismanagement or a
breach of fiduciary duty may require vast amounts of research and investigation. Not
surprisingly, investors entering this type of litigation often contact other investors in the
same fund in an effort to gather information or to propose a pooling of resources. In
Parkcentral Global, L.P. v. Brown Investment Management, L.P., the Delaware Supreme Court
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considered whether a limited partner in a Delaware limited partnership could demand, from
the general partner, a list of the names and addresses of all other limited partners. The court
ultimately held that a general partner may not use federal privacy regulations or unilaterallyissued partnership privacy notices to avoid the requirement to disclose under Delaware law.
In Parkcentral, the hedge fund Parkcentral Global, L.P. (“Parkcentral”) was
structured as a Delaware limited partnership. Investors in the fund served as limited
partners, while the manager, Parkcentral Capital Management, L.P., served as the general
partner. In August 2008, Brown Investment Management, L.P. (“Brown”) signed a
partnership agreement with Parkcentral and became a limited partner. Sections 9.1(b) and
9.1(c) of the signed partnership agreement were substantially identical to language from parts
of title 6, section 17-305 of the Delaware Code, which grants each partner in a Delaware
limited partnership the right to obtain certain information from the general partner,
including the names and addresses of each other partner. However, the partnership
agreement also incorporated language from section 17-305, which places limitations on the
right to obtain information, including a requirement that the partner demanding information
must state the purpose for making the demand, the general partner‟s power to refuse
disclosure if doing so would prevent damage to the partnership, and other reasonable
standards established by the general partner.
In November 2008, Parkcentral suffered losses of capital so great that all limited
partners, including Brown, lost their entire investments. As a result, Parkcentral stopped
doing business, was liquidated, and continued to operate only as was necessary to defend
against lawsuits. In early 2009, alleging mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duty, several
Parkcentral investors brought a class action claim against entities affiliated with Parkcentral,
including its general partner, Parkcentral Capital Management, L.P., in Texas federal court
(the “Texas litigation”). Although Brown was not directly involved in the Texas litigation,
later that year, Brown wrote to Parkcentral requesting the names and addresses of each of
Parkcentral‟s limited partners. Parkcentral first denied the request because Brown had failed
to provide a purpose for demanding the information. When Brown reiterated the demand
and explained in writing that it sought the names of other partners in order to investigate
claims made by Parkcentral limited partners in the Texas litigation, Parkcentral again refused
the request, claiming this time that privacy obligations prevented such a disclosure.
In February 2010, Brown filed suit in the Delaware Court of Chancery to compel
Parkcentral to turn over the names and addresses of the other partners. After a trial, the vice
chancellor found that based on the language in the partnership agreement, Brown had met
all requirements set forth for access to the information. The vice chancellor then ordered
Parkcentral to surrender the list. In May 2010, Parkcentral appealed.
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the vice chancellor‟s decision,
holding that Parkcentral‟s refusal to grant Brown‟s request for the names and addresses of
other investors could not be justified by the partnership‟s privacy notices, federal privacy
regulations, or the language of the partnership agreement. Parkcentral first argued that its
annual privacy notices to investors, which stated that Parkcentral would generally not
disclose non-public information about current or former investors, were “reasonable
standards governing access to information” as allowed by the partnership agreement. The
court held, however, that the privacy notices went beyond reasonably governing access to
information and instead completely denied a right granted in the partnership agreement.
Additionally, the court pointed out that the privacy notices were unilaterally issued and could
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not supersede the rights granted in the partnership agreement, a legally binding document
signed by all parties.
Second, Parkcentral argued that federal privacy regulations, including rules adopted
by the Federal Trade Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission, prevented
Parkcentral from disclosing nonpublic information about investors. The court noted that
these regulations typically require that an investment company provide each partner with
adequate notice and an opportunity to opt-out before it discloses any non-public
information. Parkcentral also alleged that these federal regulations pre-empt state law,
including the section of the Delaware Code that had been incorporated into Parkcentral‟s
partnership agreement. The court, however, rejected Parkcentral‟s argument for two
reasons. First, the court highlighted language in the federal regulations that provided an
exception to the opt-out requirements when disclosure is necessary to comply with federal,
state, or local laws. Here, the court held that the Delaware Code provisions that require
general partners to comply with limited partners‟ information requests fall within the
exception. Second, the court noted that each federal privacy regulation applied only to
disclosures to “unaffiliated third parties.” Because limited partners are in no way
“unaffiliated” with the partnership, the federal privacy regulations did not even apply.
Lastly, Parkcentral alleged that under the language of the partnership agreement, it
could deny Brown‟s request for the names of all limited partners because revealing that
information would damage the partnership. Acknowledging that the relevant provisions in
the partnership agreement applied only to disclosures to “third parties,” Parkcentral also
claimed that every limited partner was functionally a third party in relation to each other
limited partner and the general partner. The court rejected this characterization, insisting
that because each limited partner and the general partner had signed the partnership
agreement, they must all be principal parties to the partnership, and none could be “third
parties.” Furthermore, the court pointed out that Parkcentral, as a liquidated partnership, no
longer had any business that could possibly be damaged by the disclosure. Even if
disclosure might damage the reputation of the general partner, the court found that
Parkcentral had failed to adequately show the potential for harm. Rejecting all three of
Parkcentral‟s principal arguments on appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the vice
chancellor‟s judgment in favor of Brown.
Although the court‟s holding in Parkcentral only applies to limited partnerships
established in Delaware, the decision will likely have a significant impact on the
establishment of similarly structured business entities. Transactional attorneys who are
working to create Delaware limited partnerships should note the court‟s insistence that
Delaware law and the partnership agreement will be the primary legal authorities used to
assess the limited partners‟ rights to information. In its decision, the court points out that
had Parkcentral barred directly in the partnership agreement any disclosure of the other
partners‟ names and addresses, Parkcentral would have been justified in refusing Brown‟s
requests. Under the court‟s analysis, neither the privacy notices nor the application of
federal securities regulations could overcome the partnership agreement‟s legal force.
The Parkcentral decision also serves as a powerful reminder for all attorneys
representing investors to pay close attention to language in partnership agreements. In order
to preserve the right to demand information from the general partner, investors should
ensure that such rights, which might normally be accessible under state law, are not revoked
by the language of the partnership agreement. Attorneys representing investors in Delaware
and in states with similar partnership disclosure laws should also be wary of situations in
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which the general partner could legitimately claim that a disclosure would harm the
partnership. Had Parkcentral not already been liquidated, it might have been able to claim
that the disclosure of limited partners‟ identities would damage its still-ongoing business
operations. Ultimately, both sides in the negotiation of a partnership agreement should
recognize the primacy of the agreement‟s language and negotiate accordingly.

CIVIL PROCEDURE
Forum selection clauses in Tennessee are voidable if an associated lawsuit is
determined to be a local action that concerns injury to the value of the plaintiff’s
land, rather than injury to the value of the plaintiff’s business. Kampert v. Valley Farmers
Coop., No. M2009-02360-COA-R10-CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 657, 2010 WL 4117146
(Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 19, 2010).
By Scott M. McLeod
Although forum selection clauses in construction contracts increase the likelihood
litigation will occur in the stipulated forum, forum selection clauses can be invalidated in
Tennessee if the litigation is a local action. However, few suits qualify as local actions, and
generally, only certain actions alleging injury to land are local actions. In Kampert v. Valley
Farmers Cooperative, the Tennessee Court of Appeals determined what constitutes a local
action in Tennessee. In its holding, the court emphasized that not all suits involving tracts
of land whose values have allegedly been reduced because of the defendant‟s conduct are
local actions. If a plaintiff has essentially suffered harm to his business rather than to his
land, the court declared that the suit must be tried in the venue specified in the contract‟s
forum selection clause, unless the party opposing enforcement demonstrates that it would be
unfair and inequitable to do so.
In May 2008, Theo and Ruth Kampert (the “Kamperts”) entered into a contract
with Valley Farmers Cooperative (“VFC”) in which VFC was to build an operational dairy
facility on the Kamperts' farmland. The contract specified that VFC would construct new
barns, sheds, and milking facilities. The contract between the Kamperts and VFC contained
a forum selection clause stating that the contract “shall be construed and interpreted under
Tennessee Law and venue for any litigation shall lie in the Circuit or Chancery Court for
McMinn County, Tennessee.”
On April 9, 2009, the Kamperts filed suit against VFC and two of its officers (the
“defendants”) in the circuit court of Giles County, Tennessee. The Kamperts alleged that
the defendants had breached the contract by exercising poor workmanship, incurring cost
overruns, and using substandard materials. Accordingly, the Kamperts claimed that the
defendants were liable for breach of contract, negligence, civil fraud, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, and violating the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act.
Relying upon the forum selection clause contained in the contract between the
parties, the defendants subsequently filed a motion to dismiss for improper venue. In
response, the Kamperts asserted that the contract‟s forum selection clause was
unenforceable under the Tennessee Supreme Court‟s decision in Hall v. Southall Brothers &
Carl, 240 S.W. 298 (Tenn. 1921), in which the court declared that under Tennessee law, any
action involving injury to real estate must be treated as a local action which may only be
brought in the county in which the real estate is located.
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Siding with the Kamperts, the trial court ruled that because the Kamperts were
asserting that their land had lost some of its value as a result of the defendants‟ actions, the
suit was a local action and could be brought in Giles County. Accordingly, the trial court
rejected the defendants' motion to dismiss for improper venue. The trial court then denied
the defendants‟ subsequent motion for interlocutory appeal. However, the Tennessee Court
of Appeals granted the defendants‟ motion for extraordinary appeal and agreed to hear their
interlocutory appeal.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals overturned the trial court‟s ruling and
held that the Kamperts‟ suit was a transitory action rather than a local action and thus could
be brought in the county specified in the forum selection clause. Reviewing the suit de
novo, the court began its assessment by analyzing the proper venue for the Kamperts‟
claims. The court explained that when determining proper venue, it is important to
differentiate causes of action that are transitory from those that are local. Transitory actions,
such as personal injury claims arising from torts or actions for recovery of personal property,
are based on causes of action that can arise anywhere. In contrast, local actions, which
generally involve land disputes such as actions to quiet title or actions for injuries to real
estate, are based on causes of action that can only arise in a particular locality. Importantly,
the court noted that not every action involving land is a local action, and in actions involving
land in which the plaintiff has sustained injury to his business rather than to his land, the
action is certainly not a local action.
The court then explained that parties can stipulate to a particular venue for
resolution of transitory actions through contract under Tennessee law. The court stated that
it is well established that Tennessee courts should enforce forum selection clauses in
contracts “unless other considerations, like fairness to the parties, preclude enforcement.”
The court noted, however, that although transitory actions can be brought in a particular
stipulated venue, a local action may only be brought in the county where the subject matter
of the dispute is located. Thus, venue implicates jurisdiction in local actions, and a court has
no jurisdiction to hear a local action when that court is not a proper venue for the action.
The court next addressed the Kamperts‟ contention that their suit was a local action.
Citing two previous rulings, in which actions for injuries to two barns and an orchard were
deemed local actions that could only be brought in the county in which the injured land was
located, the Kamperts argued that their action should similarly be classified as a local action.
The court rejected this argument on two grounds. First, the Kamperts failed to state in their
pleadings that the defendants‟ actions resulted in injury to the land. Second, the Kamperts
did not even suggest that the value of their land had declined because of the defendants‟
negligence. In fact, the Kamperts claimed that the injury they suffered as a result of the
defendants' negligence was the loss of earnings and profits, which were lost because the
defendants' alleged negligence had interfered with the Kamperts‟ ability to operate their dairy
business. This claim weakened the Kamperts‟ argument that their suit should be deemed a
local action because, as the court had previously explained, a suit alleging injury to one‟s
business is traditionally a transitory action.
Addressing Hall and distinguishing it from the instant case, the court noted that, in
Hall, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant had negligently damaged two barns, which had
been affixed to the land for some time. The damage to the barns caused the value of the
realty to decrease. However, in the instant case, the alleged negligence involved the
construction of new buildings on the Kamperts‟ land, which had presumably increased the
value of the land. More importantly, the court also recognized that if it were to rule that the
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instant action was a local action, such a ruling “would effectively make all actions on
construction contracts local, and it would render void any forum selection clause in a
construction contract that designates venue in a county other than the one where the
construction takes place.”
In support of its position, the court asserted that the language in section 66-11-208
of the Tennessee Code implies that forum selection clauses in construction contracts can be
enforceable. The court then emphasized that because the Kamperts‟ claims were “of a type
that could arise anywhere,” the Kamperts‟ action was transitory in nature, and accordingly,
the trial court erred in holding that the forum selection clause in the contract was
unenforceable without evidence that it would be unfair and inequitable to enforce it. In the
interests of justice and judicial economy, the court then directed the trial court to transfer the
case to an appropriate court in McMinn County, Tennessee.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals‟ ruling in Kampert affirms the enforceability of
forum selection clauses in construction contracts involving real property located in the state
of Tennessee. In light of the current economic downturn and the profoundly negative
effects it has had on the construction industry, this ruling preserves the ability of
construction companies and contractors to use forum selection clauses to their advantage
when drafting construction contracts. Attorneys representing construction companies and
contractors should encourage their clients to utilize carefully worded forum selection clauses
to ensure that litigation will take place in a favorable and convenient forum, should it
become necessary. Attorneys should also advise these clients that if they engage in actions
that directly affect the value of land and a subsequent lawsuit is determined to be a local
action, the forum selection clause may be circumvented. Attorneys representing people
hiring construction companies and contractors should inform their clients that courts will
determine that a lawsuit is a local action if the defendant‟s actions caused injury to the value
of the plaintiff‟s land rather than to the value of the plaintiff‟s business. Finally, in order to
increase the likelihood that a court will deem a suit a local action, attorneys representing
individuals such as the Kamperts should be careful to state in their pleadings that their
clients have been injured because the value of their clients‟ land, rather than their business,
has decreased as a direct result of the defendant‟s actions.

CONTRACTS
In Tennessee, a contractor performing remodeling or repair work owes a nondelegable duty to ensure that all work that he is contractually obligated to perform is
completed in a careful and workmanlike manner. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters, No. E200902065-COA-R3-CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 652, 2010 WL 4065609 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct.
18, 2010), cert. granted (Feb. 16, 2011).
By William T. Smith
In Bowling v. Jones, 300 S.W.3d 288, 295 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008), the Tennessee Court
of Appeals found that under a contract for the construction of a residence, a general
contractor owed an implied contractual duty to perform all contracted-for work in a
workmanlike manner. Consequently, the Bowling court found that assigning specific tasks to
subcontractors did not absolve the general contractor of liability for breach of his
contractual obligations. The court‟s ruling provided homebuilders with a useful contractual
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remedy but did not define the scope of a contractor‟s duty to perform in a workmanlike
manner.
In Federal Insurance Co. v. Winters, the court of appeals applied Bowling and expanded
the duty to perform in a workmanlike manner to cover instances in which a contractor
delegates remodeling or repair work to a subcontractor. The case presented the issue of
whether a plaintiff could recover from a defendant roofer whose subcontractor caused a fire
that destroyed the plaintiff‟s home. The trial court awarded the defendant summary
judgment after it found that, under the facts of the case, the defendant could not be held
liable in tort for the negligent acts of its subcontractor and could not be held liable under
contract because the plaintiff‟s damages were unforeseeable. The court of appeals reversed
the trial court and remanded the case. It found that the trial court failed to consider the
defendant contractor‟s non-delegable duty to ensure that the contracted-for work was
performed in a workmanlike manner.
In Winters, Federal Insurance Company (the “plaintiff”), as subrogee of Robert and
Joanie Emerson (the “Emersons”), brought suit against Martin Winters, owner and sole
employee of Winters Roofing Company. In 2007, the Emersons contracted with defendant
Winters for the installation of a new roof on their residence. The Emersons, who claimed
that they decided to hire Winters based upon representations on Winters‟ website that the
roofing company was covered by general liability insurance, orally agreed to pay Winters
$17,832 for the work. At no time were the Emersons informed that Winters would use
subcontractors for the work or that Winters‟ insurance was lapsed.
Winters initially hired subcontractor Monk to replace the Emersons‟ roof. Monk
replaced the entire roof in a matter of two weeks and returned to fix three leaks discovered
approximately one month thereafter. However, a few weeks after Monk‟s repairs, the
Emersons informed Winters that the roof continued to leak at the drain. On September 26,
2007, Winters sent subcontractor Jacobs to fix the leak. While repairing the tar roof with a
propane torch, Jacobs sparked a fire that caused substantial damage to the Emersons‟ home.
At trial, the plaintiff alleged (1) that Winters was negligent and failed to use
reasonable care when replacing the roof and (2) that Winters breached the contract to
provide a new roof by failing to complete the roof carefully and to perform the work with
liability insurance. Plaintiff sought to recover over $800,000 in claims paid to the Emersons.
Winters moved for summary judgment, claiming that he had sublet the work to an
unsupervised subcontractor and that he had not participated in any of the work itself.
Winters testified that Jacobs had signed a subcontract agreement stating that Jacobs would
be liable for any damages resulting from his work. Winters also contended that the
Emersons had never inquired about insurance. Winters admitted that the fire occurred while
his insurance was lapsed but stated that he had purchased insurance a few days after the
accident.
The trial court granted summary judgment to defendant Winters. The trial court
found that the plaintiff‟s tort claim failed because the plaintiff failed to show that Winters
negligently hired subcontractor Jacobs and failed to demonstrate that Winters supervised or
otherwise exerted control over Jacobs‟ work; similarly, the trial court found that the
plaintiff‟s contract claim failed because the plaintiff failed to show that the fire was caused by
the contracted-for service and that the resulting damages were foreseeable.
On appeal, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the plaintiff should be able to
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proceed with its breach of contract claim. The court found that Winters, though
guaranteeing his work by warranty, did not deliver a functional roof but, rather, installed one
riddled with leaks. Likewise, the court of appeals also reversed the trial court‟s finding that
the damages caused by the fire were unforeseeable. The court of appeals found that the trial
court failed to consider Winters‟ non-delegable duty to ensure that all the work that he was
contractually obligated to complete was performed in a workmanlike manner. Finally, the
court of appeals noted that the trial court should have considered Winters‟ potential liability
for misrepresenting the status of his insurance. Though his website represented that he was
covered by general liability insurance, Winters admitted that his insurance was lapsed at the
time of the accident. Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the trial court‟s grant of
summary judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.
In reaching these conclusions, the court of appeals relied upon the “general rule”
that under every contract, there exists an implied, non-delegable duty to perform the
contracted-for services in a workmanlike fashion. The court cited the following language
from Bowling, 300 S.W.3d at 295, as precedent applying the implied duty to a construction
case: “The [defendants] had a contractual duty to construct the house to completion and to
perform the construction in a workmanlike manner. Their unilateral delegation of work to
third parties did not absolve them of this duty.” Though Bowling applied to the construction
of a new house, the court noted the case‟s applicability to the remodeling or repair task at
hand. The court reasoned that, like the general contractors in Bowling, Winters should not be
able to escape the duty of workmanlike performance that he assumed through contract
merely by passing off the task to a subcontractor. It relied upon the principle that
performance, though it may be entrusted to another, may not be estranged from liability. As
the one who contracted to provide the service, the contractor is impliedly obligated to
ensure that the work is performed with due workmanlike care.
The court buttressed its position with several cases from other jurisdictions—
namely Delaware, Kansas, Minnesota, New Mexico, Washington, and Wisconsin. As
explained in Brooks v. Hayes, 395 N.W.2d 167, 169 (Wis. 1986), the cases stand for the
proposition that “the delegation of the performance of a contract does not, unless the
obligee agrees otherwise, discharge the liability of the delegating obligor to the obligee for
breach of contract.” In particular, the court cited a case strikingly similar to the one at hand:
White Pass Co. v. St. John, 427 P.2d 398 (Wash. 1967). In White Pass, a general contractor
subcontracted out work during the enlargement of a ski lodge to an independent contractor.
The Washington Supreme Court held that the ski lodge owner could recover from the
general contractor despite the fact that the independent contractor‟s negligence caused the
fire damages. White Pass and the many other cases cited by the court emphasize a central
theme: barring express agreement to the contrary, the duty of workmanlike performance—
whether performance of construction, renovation, or repair—is not delegable. The
contractor is contractually obligated to provide full and workmanlike performance. Until
performance is complete, the subcontractor‟s acts are considered to be the contractor‟s own.
Thus, until the Tennessee Supreme Court addresses the case, Winters puts
contractors on notice. Winters expands the duty of workmanlike performance announced in
Bowling to cover contracts for remodeling or repair. In remanding the case to the trial court
with instructions to consider the contractor‟s duty of workmanlike performance, the court of
appeals displayed its commitment to the concept. Regardless of how the Tennessee
Supreme Court ultimately rules, attorneys on both sides of the table should advise their
clients to discuss the use of subcontractors on their projects and should inform clients of the
duty of workmanlike performance. Moreover, agreements between contractors and
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subcontractors should explicitly provide for whether the subcontractor assumes the duty of
workmanlike performance. Finally, in contrast to defendant Winters, contractors should
ensure that their insurance never lapses. As Winters illustrates, though performance may be
delegated, liability generally may not. Unless the parties otherwise agree, the risk falls upon
the contractor. As implied in the very contract, the duty of workmanlike performance is his.

INSURANCE
In Tennessee, insurers have the burden of specifying when the insured will be
required to notify it of changes in material information arising after an insurance
policy has been issued. Adams v. Tenn. Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., No. W2009-00931-COA-R3CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 262, 2010 WL 1444477 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 13, 2010).
By David Otten
Adams v. Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Co. presents several important issues for
attorneys dealing with insurance contracts. First, the court addressed whether a consumer
must have an ownership interest in property to have an insurable interest. Second, the court
addressed whether an insured has a duty to notify the insurance company of changes in
information material to the risk of the contract. Finally, the court addressed whether an
insured may recover damages up to the limit of the policy, even though he does not have an
ownership interest. The court held that it is not necessary for an interest in property to be
an ownership interest for that interest to be insurable; that absent an express term in the
insurance contract, the insured has no duty to inform the insurer of changes in information
material to the risk of the contract arising after the policy has been issued; and that the
insured may recover the full amount of the policy, even if his interest in the property is not
an ownership interest. This case was decided by the Tennessee Court of Appeals and not
only solidified existing Tennessee law but also created new law based on the law of other
jurisdictions.
In 1992, Joseph Adams bought a house and land in Chester County, Tennessee.
Adams had the name of his son, Shane, placed on the deed instead of his own, to ensure that
the property would pass to his sons if something happened to him. When Adams applied
for homeowner‟s insurance with Tennessee Farmers Mutual Insurance Company
(“Tennessee Farmers”), he also listed his son as the name of the insured on the insurance
application and explained to his agent that the deed to the property was in his son‟s name
instead of his own. Tennessee Farmers subsequently issued the policy. When Adams‟s
youngest son, Dustin, turned eighteen, Shane gave Dustin a one-half interest in the property
and recorded the new deed. Adams then instructed his insurance agent to add Dustin as an
additional insured to his homeowner‟s insurance policy, which the agent did.
In 2000, Adams moved to California, and his sons executed a warranty deed
conveying the property back to him. After the deed was recorded, Adams applied to
Tennessee Farmers for a homeowner‟s insurance policy, naming himself as the insured, and
the policy was issued. Adams moved back to Tennessee in 2002 and again submitted a new
application for homeowner‟s insurance with Tennessee Farmers. The new application
required that the applicant have an ownership or insurable interest in the property. Adams
listed himself as the applicant, and Tennessee Farmers issued the homeowners policy in
December 2002.
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In 2005, Adams conveyed the property back to his sons by warranty deed and the
deed was recorded. Throughout the years, Adams lived in the house and maintained the
property. He paid all the taxes, insurance premiums, utility bills, improvement costs, and
other expenses associated with the property. Adams‟s sons never claimed any ownership
interest in the property, and they considered it their father‟s.
In October of 2006, the house and outbuildings on the property were destroyed by
fire. Adams made a claim under his homeowner‟s policy, but Tennessee Farmers denied the
claim because Adams had conveyed the property to his sons. Tennessee Farmers also
asserted that Adams had no insurable interest in the property at the time of the fire.
However, Tennessee Farmers paid Adams‟s claim for the loss of his personal property in the
house because the deed had no effect on the personal property he owned.
In response, Adams filed a complaint against Tennessee Farmers for breach of
contract. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Tennessee Farmers argued that
Adams had no insurable interest in the property, that he breached a duty to Tennessee
Farmers to notify it of matters material to the risk arising after the policy had been issued,
and that Adams should not have been awarded the full policy proceeds because he did not
legally own the property at the time of the casualty. The trial court held that Adams had an
insurable interest in the property, that Adams had not breached a duty to notify Tennessee
Farmers of changes in information relating to the risk of the policy, and that Adams was
entitled to the entire amount of the policy proceeds.
The first issue the court of appeals addressed was whether an insured must have an
ownership interest in property in order to have an insurable interest. In Tennessee, an
insured must have an insurable interest in the property they wish to insure in order for an
insurance contract to be valid. One has an insurable interest in property if he will gain an
advantage by its continued existence or will suffer a loss by its destruction, whether or not he
has any title in or possession of the property. Thus, the court held that the insured does not
need to have an absolute legal ownership in the property—i.e. by deed—in order to have an
insurable interest; instead, the insured needs only to derive a benefit from the existence of
the property or suffer loss from its destruction. The court noted that a benefit is sufficient
whether it is a legal, unqualified ownership interest or merely a right to use the property with
or without payment of rent.
In this case, Adams paid every expense relating to the property, including taxes,
utilities, and improvement expenses, and used the property as his residence every year.
Accordingly, the court determined that Adams did have an interest in the property sufficient
to be an insurable interest. In fact, the court stated that Adams “certainly benefitted from
[the property‟s] continued existence and suffered a loss by its destruction.” Because any
interest in property, even a mere right to use the property, is enough for a finding that an
insured has an insurable interest in the property, the court found that Adams‟s use of the
property as his primary residence was enough to show that he had an insurable interest in
the property. Accordingly, the court concluded that Tennessee Farmers‟ argument was
without merit.
The second issue that the court addressed was whether an insured has a duty to
inform the insurance provider of changes in information material to the risk of the policy
arising after the policy has been issued. The court explained that, in Tennessee,
representations made in an insurance application are continuing affirmations of the
truthfulness of such representations, but only until the policy is issued; thus, absent an
obligation to disclose in the policy agreement or by request from the insurer, no duty exists
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for the insured to notify the insurer of new information arising after the policy has been
issued. The court also found that the failure of the insured to inform the insurer of acts or
conditions occurring after the issuance or renewal of the policy would not void the policy.
Rather, citing persuasive authority from Maine and Massachusetts, the court held that the
burden is placed on the insurer to specify when the insured will be required to notify it of
changes in circumstances arising after the policy is issued.
In this case, Adams‟s insurance policy required that the insured disclose information
that was material to the risk involved. The court noted that if Adams had misrepresented his
interest in the property on his application, he would have been unable to recover on the
policy. However, while the application required Adams to warrant that the information on
the application was “true, correct and complete,” it made no mention of a requirement that
Adams update the information during the policy period. As a result, the court found that
Adams had no duty to disclose the change in legal ownership subsequent to the issuance of
the policy.
Finally, the court determined whether the award of proceeds from Tennessee
Farmers was appropriate, holding that the award of the entire proceeds from the insurance
contract was proper, even though Adams did not have a legal ownership interest in the
property. Citing authority from Oklahoma and Alabama, the court explained that the policy
limits did not exceed the loss that Adams actually suffered. In fact, Tennessee Farmers
ceded that the fire resulted in a total loss and that if Adams had legal title to the property, the
proper measure of damages would have been the policy limit. Further, the court reasoned
that Tennessee Farmers assumed the risk that there would be a total loss of the property and
that it intended to enter into a contract of indemnity for the full value of the home with
Adams. According to the court, to deny recovery of the policy limits in this case would
frustrate the legitimate expectations of the insured and would allow the insurer to avoid the
risk that it intended to insure.
The findings of this case not only solidify existing Tennessee law but also add new
facets to accepted insurance principals. By allowing any interest in property to be an
insurable interest, the court effectively allows consumers to insure property that is important
to them or that provides economic benefit, even though the consumer may not have an
ownership interest in the property. Further, by adopting new laws that shift the burden of
updating records to insurers and that allow insureds to recover the full amount of a policy,
despite the status of their interest, the court makes insurance less daunting for non-owners
and requires more diligence from insurance companies. Following this case, attorneys
representing both insureds and insurers must be careful to specifically include in insurance
agreements the obligations they wish to require of the other party. By failing to do so,
insurance attorneys, especially those working with insurance companies, may find the
litigation of an insurance contract tipped in favor of the insureds.

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
In trademark infringement cases, a likelihood of dilution by tarnishment is presumed
if there is a clear semantic association between a junior and senior trademark, and
the junior trademark is associated with sexually oriented products. V Secret Catalogue,
Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382 (6th Cir. 2010).
By Mary Lauren Walden
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In V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit addressed the issue of whether Victor‟s Little Secret, a small retail store that sold sex
toys and other sexually oriented products, created a “likelihood of dilution by tarnishment”
of the Victoria‟s Secret trademark. Specifically, the issue in V Secret was whether the
semantic association of Victor‟s Little Secret with Victoria‟s Secret amounted to a liabilitycreating mental association that constituted dilution by tarnishment when the trademark of
Victor‟s Little Secret was used to sell sexually oriented products. The Sixth Circuit held that
there was a rebuttable presumption that the semantic association between Victor‟s Little
Secret and Victoria‟s Secret created dilution by tarnishment and that Victor‟s Little Secret
failed to overcome the “inference of tarnishment” caused by its trademarks.
The relevant facts of V Secret began when a Fort Knox Army Colonel saw an
advertisement for Victor‟s Secret in a local publication. The advertisement reported that
Victor‟s Secret sold adult videos, lingerie, and other adult novelties. Although the Army
Colonel was not confused by the similarity between the trademarks of Victor‟s Secret and
Victoria‟s Secret, he was offended that Victor‟s Secret was semantically associating itself with
the famous store brand in its attempt to promote the sale of “unwholesome, tawdry
merchandise.” The Army Colonel subsequently sent a copy of the advertisement to
Victoria‟s Secret. Counsel for Victoria‟s Secret then wrote to Victor and Cathy Moseley (the
“Moseleys”), the owners of Victor‟s Secret, stating that their store name was likely to cause
confusion with the well-known Victoria‟s Secret trademark. In response, the Moseleys
changed the name of their store from Victor‟s Secret to Victor‟s Little Secret. Because this
change did not satisfy Victoria‟s Secret, it promptly filed suit for trademark infringement and
“dilution by tarnishment” in the United States District Court for the Western District of
Kentucky.
The district court issued an injunction against Victor‟s Little Secret, and the Sixth
Circuit affirmed. In 2003, based on its interpretation of language contained in the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (the “Old Act”), the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the injunction to district court. On remand, the district court reconsidered the
case based on language in a newly legislated act, the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of
2006 (the “New Act”). The passage of and amended language contained in the New Act
was a direct response to the Supreme Court‟s earlier interpretation of the Old Act in this
very case. In specific, the New Act defined “dilution by tarnishment” as an “association
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the
reputation of the famous mark.” The New Act also changed the standard for proving a
“dilution by tarnishment” claim from “actual dilution” of the senior trademark‟s reputation
to only a “likelihood of dilution.” Congress termed this new standard the “Moseley standard”
and asserted that such a revision was necessary because the Old Act‟s standard created an
undue burden for trademark holders, requiring “actual dilution” rather than a “likelihood of
dilution.” Thus, under the New Act, the question for the district court became whether
Victor‟s Little Secret created a “likelihood of dilution by tarnishment” of the Victoria‟s
Secret trademark.
Based on the language of the New Act, the district court granted summary judgment
in favor of Victoria‟s Secret, and Victor‟s Little Secret again appealed. On appeal, the Sixth
Circuit affirmed the district court‟s ruling, holding that Victor‟s Little Secret failed to
overcome the “inference of tarnishment” caused by its trademarks. Citing eight federal
cases, the Sixth Circuit noted that there was a consensus emerging in case law that the
creation of an association between a senior trademark and “lewd or bawdy sexual activity”
disparaged the senior trademark and reduced its commercial value. The court further
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interpreted the language of the New Act to create a rebuttable presumption or strong
inference that a junior trademark used to sell sexually oriented products was likely to tarnish
a senior trademark if there was a clear semantic association between the two marks. The
court then determined that this rebuttable presumption placed, on the owner of the junior
trademark, the burden of presenting evidence that there was no likelihood of tarnishment.
Observing that the Moseleys had two opportunities in the district court to offer this type of
evidence but failed to do so, the court found that Victor‟s Little Secret created a likelihood
of tarnishment to the Victoria‟s Secret trademark.
Next, the court addressed three other issues raised by the Moseleys: first, whether
the “Law of the Case Doctrine” meant that the Supreme Court‟s decision in the Moseleys‟
favor remained in effect; second, whether the New Act was retroactive; and third, whether,
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(5), Victoria‟s Secret qualified for injunctive relief and certain
other remedies. For the first issue, the court found that the “Law of the Case Doctrine” did
not apply to this case because Congress changed the law while the case was pending. For
the second issue, the court stated that new statutes may be applied to pending cases where,
as was the situation in this case, prospective relief is sought for ongoing conduct. The court
resolved the third issue by finding that § 1125(c)(5) merely referred to “additional remedies”
not included in 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1), which allows for an injunction anytime after a
trademark becomes famous. Because Victoria‟s Secret had satisfied each of the requirements
under § 1125(c)(1) for injunctive relief, the court concluded that the district court did not err
in its decision in favor of Victoria‟s Secret.
In her dissent, Circuit Judge Karen Nelson Moore brought up a crucial point that
the New Act contains two requirements: that there be an association between the two marks
and that there be a likelihood of harm to the senior mark. Judge Moore also noted that,
although courts have concluded that “dilution by tarnishment” is likely when a trademark‟s
likeness is associated with sexual activity, courts cannot ignore the statutory requirement of
reputational harm. Judge Moore pointed out that the V Secret case was unlike the cases cited
by the majority because both Victoria‟s Secret and Victor‟s Little Secret sold sexually
oriented products. Thus, the involvement of Victor‟s Little Secret with sexually oriented
products was less likely to tarnish the reputation of the Victoria‟s Secret trademark. She
concluded that when dealing with a junior trademark of sexual character, the bright-line rule
of presuming a likelihood of harm to the reputation of a senior trademark was not what
Congress intended when enacting the New Act.
The Sixth Circuit‟s decision in favor of Victoria‟s Secret in this case demonstrates
the court‟s desire to stand by the bright-line rule in emerging case law that where a senior
trademark is semantically associated with a sexually oriented junior trademark, there is a
rebuttable presumption that the senior trademark is likely to be tarnished. As a result of this
decision, businesses with famous trademarks will no longer be required to show actual
dilution in order to prove “dilution by tarnishment.” Instead, by simply demonstrating that
the junior trademark was associated with sexually oriented products, a likelihood of dilution
will already be presumed. In these situations, the owner of the junior trademark will then
have the burden of disproving such a presumption.
However, it is also important to note that the majority did not consider the issue
raised by the dissent that both trademarks in this case were associated with sexually oriented
products. Based on the dissent‟s logical argument, future courts may consider whether a
senior trademark is sexually related before determining whether the sexual character of a
junior trademark likely tarnishes the senior trademark. It is possible that the dissent may
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cause future courts to apply the bright-line rule only where a junior trademark is of sexual
character and the senior trademark is not. Finally, while the Sixth Circuit applied the
emerging rule in case law to this particular case, Sixth Circuit attorneys should not overlook
the New Act‟s two requirements for dilution by tarnishment: an association between two
trademarks and a likelihood of harm to the senior trademark.

MISREPRESENTATION
In Tennessee, real estate appraisals, while an opinion of value, can form the basis of
an intentional misrepresentation claim and do not by their opinion-nature compel
summary judgment. Davis v. McGuigan, 325 S.W.3d 149 (Tenn. 2010).
By Greer Lynch
When considering the purchase of real property, most homebuyers finance their
purchase with a residential bank loan. To determine the amount of the loan, banks generally
rely on third-party appraisers to evaluate the necessary costs of buying or building the home.
The bank then makes an internal determination as to how much money to make available
for the homebuyer. Although the appraisal typically contains no guarantees to the
homebuyer and is designed only for use by the bank, homebuyers sometimes use the
appraisal to gauge the future value of their home. In Davis v. McGuigan, the Tennessee
Supreme Court addressed whether a third-party appraiser, by issuing an overvalued appraisal,
could be liable to a homebuyer for fraudulent misrepresentation or for causes of action
under the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (the “TCPA”). The court held that an
opinion could form the basis of a fraudulent misrepresentation claim and, with genuine
issues of material fact remaining, determined that summary judgment was precluded as to
both the intentional misrepresentation and the TCPA claims.
The relevant facts leading to McGuigan began when Joseph and Kimberli Davis (the
“Davises”) purchased a corner lot in the Horseshoe Bend subdivision near Nashville,
Tennessee, for $135,500. They planned to design and build a custom home on the lot and
were given an estimate of nearly $600,000 by a contractor for the cost of building the home
to specifications. The total cost for the lot and construction would be over $730,000. The
Davises submitted a Uniform Residential Loan Application to SunTrust Bank (“SunTrust”)
for $580,000, and SunTrust sent an appraisal request to Patrick McGuigan (“McGuigan”), an
appraiser regularly used by SunTrust. McGuigan produced an appraisal report using two
methods to appraise the property. Using the “cost approach,” he estimated the cost per
square foot with various references and appraised the Davises‟ property value at $731,000.
Using the “comparison approach,” he evaluated the recent sale of comparable properties,
choosing three properties in the LaurelBrooke subdivision “deemed the best and/or the
most similar sales available” and appraised the Davises‟ property at a value of $735,000.
McGuigan forwarded his appraisal report to SunTrust, estimating the property‟s market
value at $735,000 and including a disclaimer stating that the report “is not to be relied upon
by third parties for any purpose, whatsoever.” SunTrust subsequently informed the Davises
that their proposed loan application for $580,000 was approved. By the loan‟s closing on
July 2, 2002, the Davises had not read the appraisal report provided by McGuigan to
SunTrust.
Over a year later, Mr. Davis returned to SunTrust for a home equity loan. SunTrust
ordered a second appraisal, and a value of $510,000 was stated for the Davises‟ property.
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The loan request was denied. The Davises later decided to sell their home, and six separate
real estate agencies estimated the home‟s sale price between $590,000 and $625,000. The
Davises eventually listed their home for $679,000, closing with the first prospective buyer for
$660,000 on April 13, 2005. Soon thereafter, the Davises filed a complaint against
McGuigan claiming that he intentionally or negligently misrepresented the market value of
their home and also that he violated the TCPA. The trial court granted summary judgment
to McGuigan with regard to the intentional misrepresentation claim and the TCPA claim,
and the Davises voluntarily dismissed their negligent misrepresentation claim. On appeal,
the intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court‟s granting of summary judgment,
holding that an appraisal cannot provide the basis for an intentional misrepresentation claim
as it is an estimate or opinion and is not considered a fact. The Tennessee Supreme Court
granted permission to appeal.
The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment and remanded the
case to the trial court for further proceedings. Using a six-element test, the court reasoned
that McGuigan had the burden to either affirmatively negate an essential element of the
intentional misrepresentation claim or to show that the Davises could not prove an essential
element of their claim. In so doing, McGuigan challenged the first, fourth, fifth, and sixth
elements of the claim: (1) that McGuigan made a representation of an existing or past fact;
(4) that McGuigan made the representation recklessly, with knowledge that it was false; (5)
that the Davises reasonably relied on the representation; and (6) that the Davises were
damaged by relying on the representation. Each element was analyzed in turn.
First and most significantly, the court held that an opinion of value is a material fact
and may provide the basis for a fraudulent misrepresentation claim. McGuigan contended
that his appraisal was an opinion and could not provide a basis for the Davises to claim he
made a representation of fact. However, the court referenced section 62-39-102(3) of the
Tennessee Code, Tennessee case law, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts, in determining
that an appraisal “develop[s] an opinion of [market] value,” which is an exception to the
general rule that opinions do not constitute a basis of fraud. Thus, the court determined that
opinions “may give rise to an intentional misrepresentation claim” where the opinion is of a
form that “leaves no room for [doubt][,]” the speaker‟s relationship to the recipient is that of
a disinterested expert, and “the fact that such person holds the opinion is material.”
As for the remaining elements, the court next determined that evidence of
McGuigan‟s deviation from the Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice (the
“USPAP”) allowed a reasonable person to question whether the appraisal was made
recklessly with knowledge of its falsity. Third, the court found that the Davises did not rely
on the appraisal report at all but, instead, relied on the figure conveyed to them by SunTrust
and that any recovery should be based, not on how the representation was relayed, but on
the representation alone. Coupled with an expert witness‟s testimony that “[a]ppraisers
know . . . buyers . . . are likely to rely upon their conclusions in making decisions[,]” the
court found that a reasonable person could reach separate conclusions also as to whether the
Davises‟ reasonably relied on the appraisal. Finally, the court concluded that McGuigan was
unable to introduce undisputed facts showing that the Davises were exceptionally motivated
to sell their property at a reduced value without relying on the appraisal. By establishing
genuine issues of material fact for all disputed elements, the Davises persuaded the court
that summary judgment was not warranted.
Alternatively, McGuigan also moved for summary judgment on the TCPA claim.
The TCPA offers a broad cause of action for losses resulting from an “unfair or deceptive

212

TRANSACTIONS: THE TENNESSEE JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[VOL. 12

act or practice declared to be unlawful” under the Act. Without proof of any specific
unlawful act by McGuigan, the court found that the Davises had the burden to prove that
McGuigan was otherwise engaged in deceptive practices or omissions likely to mislead a
reasonable consumer. Again, the court determined that McGuigan‟s deviation from the
USPAP provided a question of fact for which a reasonable person could reach different
conclusions. The Tennessee Supreme Court, therefore, reasoned that summary judgment
was not appropriate and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
The court‟s decision in Davis v. McGuigan gives caution to appraisers and
demonstrates a trend in favor of individual homebuyers, opposite their loaning counterparts.
In this case, the Davises purchased and sold their home while a continual rise in the housing
market climbed to its historic apex. However, the case arrived at the Tennessee Supreme
Court following one of the greatest housing market declines in the history of the United
States. Considering McGuigan in the shadow of the housing bubble burst, the court placed
an additional burden on appraisers to arguably insure their appraisals against a falling market.
Reiterating a previous decision, the court even hints that the case against McGuigan is not
particularly strong but still requires deliberation. Appraisers and the financial institutions
that they support must be aware of this potential liability, and their attorneys should take
specific action to inform loan applicants that the appraisal they receive should not be relied
upon for determining the potential worth of the appraised property.
Acknowledging that the court‟s remand allows further factual discovery for the trier
of fact, it still must be recognized that the court‟s findings likely provide homebuyers with
additional security, shielding the homebuyer from the full risk of his purchase and providing
a means to charge someone else with his poor bargain. From a policy standpoint, it may
seem appropriate to increase the liability of appraisers, but it is arguably of equal importance
to require that a homebuyer make himself acquainted with the fundamental facts
surrounding the purchase of a property. In light of the Tennessee Supreme Court‟s decision
in McGuigan, an appraiser should be thoroughly cautioned against inadvertently overvaluing a
property‟s worth. If not careful, he may face the consequence of legal costs associated with
defending himself against dissatisfied homebuyers caught in a bad deal.

PROPERTY
In Tennessee, unless a tenant’s assignee personally assumes the tenant’s obligations
under a lease, the tenant remains liable for damages caused by the assignee during
both the lease’s initial term and any subsequent periods for which the lease is
extended, even if such extensions result from the assignee’s holdover tenancy. Patton
v. Massey, No. E2009-00408-COA-R3-CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 499, 2010 WL 3025551
(Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2010).
By Dan Calvert
Under Tennessee law, tenants‟ liability for damages caused by third parties to whom
they assign their leasehold interests takes on added significance in light of the multiple means
by which a lease may be extended beyond its initial term. While past Tennessee decisions
clarified the means by which a tenant may effectively exercise an option to extend a lease,
ambiguity remained regarding an assigning tenant‟s liability for damages incurred by an
assignee after the expiration of the lease‟s initial term. In Patton v. Massey, the Tennessee
Court of Appeals addressed this issue, holding that if a lease‟s initial term is extended,
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whether by the tenant‟s exercise of an option or by the assignee‟s holdover tenancy, the
tenant is liable for damages caused by the assignee during the subsequent term.
In Patton, Larry Massey entered into a residential lease with an option to purchase
the leased property (the “Lease”) with Randall Patton. The Lease required monthly rental
payments for a period of 24 months, a term that could be extended “for a period of 12
months” upon the mutual agreement of Patton and Massey. Soon after executing the Lease,
Massey assigned his interest therein to Patricia McCormick and entered into a separate
purchase option lease with McCormick (the “McCormick Lease”) that would expire on the
same date as the Lease, December 31, 2006.
As this date approached, Patton and Massey discussed extending the Lease. When
Patton refused to offer an extension in writing, Massey tendered his final rental payment and
informed Patton that he would allow the Lease to expire by its own terms. McCormick
remained on the property after the Lease‟s expiration, however, and in January 2007, Patton
sent Massey an eviction notice demanding he surrender the property. At trial, Patton
claimed that after sending this notice, he and Massey orally agreed to extend the Lease an
additional two months to give Massey and McCormick time to obtain financing to purchase
the property. McCormick remained on the property until April 2007, four months after the
Lease had expired, during which time neither McCormick nor Massey paid rent. Patton
thereafter attempted but was unable to collect the unpaid amounts from McCormick.
As a result, Patton filed suit against Massey to recover these unpaid balances as well
as additional amounts to compensate him for damage to the property and attorney‟s fees.
After a bench trial, the court found that Patton and Massey had orally agreed to extend the
Lease and that Massey was liable for the additional four months of rent and for property
damage caused by McCormick.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court‟s judgment and
further clarified the extent to which tenants who assign their leasehold interests to third
parties are liable for damages caused by such third-party assignees. Considering first
whether the Lease was renewed by oral agreement, the court examined Tennessee precedent
regarding when a tenant may be deemed to have exercised an option to extend a lease‟s term.
The court explained that, to renew or extend a lease, parties do not have to execute a new
agreement if the lease grants the tenant an option to extend the lease‟s term; where a tenant
exercises such an option, a new contract is formed for the new period, subject to the
conditions and covenants contained in the original lease. The court also clarified that if the
lease does not stipulate the time or method by which the option must be exercised, the
tenant may exercise it by remaining in possession of the property after the lease‟s initial term
expires and paying the required rent.
Turning to the facts therein, the Patton court held that the evidence on record was
insufficient to warrant overturning the trial court‟s finding that Patton and Massey had orally
agreed to extend the Lease. While Massey refuted Patton‟s claim that they had reached an
oral agreement, this assertion, supported only by Massey‟s own testimony, was insufficient to
preponderate against the trial court‟s adoption of Patton‟s factual account. In addition, the
court concluded that Patton‟s claim was supported by the fact that McCormick remained on
the property for four months after the Lease‟s expiration and that no evidence existed that
she did so knowingly or in bad faith.
Having thus affirmed the trial court‟s finding that Patton and Massey had orally
agreed to extend the Lease, the court clarified that a contrary holding in this regard would
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not have led to a different result. According to the Lease‟s terms, any holding over after the
Lease‟s expiration created a month-to-month tenancy, subject to the conditions and
covenants of the original Lease. In light of this clause, the court declared that, even if the
Lease had not been extended by oral agreement, McCormick‟s holdover tenancy effectively
extended the Lease to encompass the subsequent months during which she remained on the
property.
Because of the lack of evidence that McCormick had assumed Massey‟s obligations
under the Lease, the court held Massey liable for unpaid rent resulting from McCormick‟s
holdover tenancy. Citing a well-established principle of property law, the court declared that
an assignment alone does not terminate the original tenant‟s privity of contract with and
resulting liability to the landlord; the original tenant‟s contractual responsibilities are relieved
only if the assignee expressly assumes them. Because no such assumption accompanied the
assignment therein, the Patton court held that Massey remained responsible for ensuring that
possession of the property was returned to Patton upon the Lease‟s expiration. The court
thus concluded that, even if Patton and Massey had not agreed to extend the Lease and
McCormick‟s continued residence on the property was merely a holdover tenancy, Massey
was nevertheless liable for unpaid rental payments incurred during this period. In addition,
the court concluded that the lack of an assumption by McCormick also meant that Massey
was not relieved of his obligation to return the property undamaged. Therefore, the court
held that Massey was liable for physical damage to the property, including damage caused by
McCormick.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals‟ decision in Patton v. Massey illustrates the multiple
means by which a tenant‟s liability may be extended beyond the initial term of the tenant‟s
lease. However, the simplicity of the facts in Patton enabled the court to reach its conclusion
while conflating the multiple, distinct inquiries likely most relevant to practitioners. In light
of the Patton opinion and the cases cited therein, an attorney assessing the possibility of a
tenant‟s continuing liability after a lease‟s expiration should consider the following three
issues.
First, the attorney should determine whether the lease contains an option to extend
its term. Second, if such an option exists, the attorney should determine whether the timing
of the alleged exercise thereof accords with applicable conditions in the lease. If the lease
requires the option to be exercised “at the lease‟s end,” an alleged exercise thereafter is
insufficient. In cases such as Patton where the lease contains no such limitation, the option
may be exercised within a reasonable time after the lease‟s expiration. Third, the attorney
should examine whether the tenant‟s conduct constitutes an effective exercise of the option.
If the lease requires the tenant to give notice of its election to exercise the option, the option
cannot be exercised absent such notice. If not, the tenant‟s holdover tenancy and continued
payment of agreed-upon rent creates the presumption that the tenant exercised the option.
Conversely, this presumption cannot arise where the lease requires increased rent during the
extension period but the tenant continues to pay the lesser amount due under the initial
term.
Because Patton did not require the court to distinguish whether the continued
possession therein amounted to a holdover tenancy or an exercise of the extension option,
practitioners should be careful not to interpret Patton as permitting the above presumption
where a tenant merely remains in possession of the property and does not pay the required
rent. Because the court affirmed that the parties therein had agreed to extend the Lease, this
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presumption, which applies in the absence of such an agreement, could not have been
relevant to the trial court‟s decision.
However, attorneys should note the ramifications that the Patton court‟s dicta may
have on future trial court opinions. Having already affirmed the trial court‟s finding that
Patton and Massey had agreed to extend the Lease, the Patton court went on to provide a
detailed illustration of why its decision would not have differed had the trial court not made
this finding of fact but had merely construed the continued possession therein as a holdover
tenancy. Given this indication by the court of appeals, trial courts faced with similar
circumstances may be more receptive to holdover-tenancy treatment; accordingly, plaintiffs
may be more likely to focus their arguments on such treatment rather than undertake the
more difficult task of proving the existence of an oral extension agreement. However, the
facts in Patton fall within a very narrow range of circumstances in which holdover-tenancy
treatment and option-exercise treatment necessarily come to the same ends. Thus, a clearer
designation regarding the nature of McCormick‟s continued residence might have benefitted
practitioners. For example, such a determination will be necessary in similar circumstances
where a lease‟s extension provision requires the tenant to pay increased rent or extends the
tenant‟s obligations beyond those created by holdover tenancy.
Even if the oral extension argued by Patton did occur, practitioners should note the
additional issues that would have arisen had holdover-tenancy treatment and option-exercise
treatment not functioned identically herein. The trial court‟s decision in Patton appeared to
allow holdover tenancy to effectively extend an exercised option beyond the time period
agreed upon by the parties. As Patton testified, he and Massey had agreed to extend the
Lease for an additional two months, yet the trial court appeared to treat this extension as
covering the entire four months during which McCormick remained on the property. Such
flexible treatment of the option‟s length would have prevented Patton from evicting
McCormick after the two-month period since the subsequent months would have been
considered extended periods pursuant to the option rather than holdover tenancy. Although
the Patton court did not expressly reject this treatment, its focus on holdover tenancy
suggests that the circumstances therein were more properly characterized as an initial twomonth extension followed by a two-month holdover tenancy. This implicit distinction,
while not relevant in Patton, will be crucial where such characterization affects the amount of
rent for which a tenant is liable or where a landlord does not consent to a tenant‟s holdover
tenancy.

SECURED TRANSACTIONS
When determining whether a duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially
reasonable manner exists between two or more secured parties, Tennessee courts
look to the disposing party’s degree of participation and control in the disposition.
Regions Bank v. Trailer Source, No. M2008-01167-COA-R3-CV, 2010 Tenn. App. LEXIS 351,
2010 WL 2074590 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2010).
By Crystal L. Lucas
According to section 47-9-610 of the Tennessee Code, after a debtor defaults, a
secured party may take action to dispose of the collateral, provided that it does so in a
commercially reasonable manner. Typically, where the secured party takes physical
possession of the collateral, the debtor may assert that the disposition was commercially
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unreasonable. Applying the rule becomes less clear, however, when a junior secured party
makes a “commercially unreasonable” allegation against a senior secured party that lacked
actual possession of the collateral, and it was the debtor, not the senior secured party, that
conducted the sale. The Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed this issue in Regions Bank v.
Trailer Source. The court held that the duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially
reasonable manner arises between a junior and senior secured party if the evidence shows
that the disposing party possessed enough control to approve or disapprove the disposition.
Where such a duty arises, the court concluded that low proceeds resulting from the senior
secured party‟s failure to appraise the collateral before the sale does not alone prove a
commercially unreasonable disposition.
In Trailer Source, Regions Bank (“Regions”) loaned $640,000 to Trailer Source, Inc.
(“Trailer Source”), a retailer of new and used semi truck trailers. The loan was secured by
Trailer Source‟s accounts, inventory, and general intangibles, and Regions perfected its
security interest in July 1999. Trailer Source acquired its used trailers from customer tradeins and purchased its new trailers from Southern Trailer (“Southern”), which purchased the
trailers directly from the manufacturer, Hyundai Translead (“Hyundai”).
In 2002, Hyundai sued both Trailer Source and Southern to recover payment for
new trailers. To settle the lawsuit, the parties negotiated the “Hyundai Agreement,” which
secured the $20 million debt owed to Hyundai. The Hyundai Agreement also granted
Hyundai a security interest in 1,431 used trailers that Trailer Source and Southern owned.
Under the Hyundai Agreement, the certificates of title for the trailers were held in a lockbox
account at First Bank, Hyundai approved all sales of the used trailers, and Hyundai received
75% of any proceeds from the sales. Although the Hyundai Agreement did not specify who
owned which trailers, Hyundai was aware that its interest in the trailers owned by Trailer
Source was subordinate to Regions‟ perfected security interest. Because Hyundai initially
failed to describe the collateral in its filed financing statement, its security interest was not
perfected until September 23, 2003.
Also in September 2003, with $381,969 outstanding on its loan from Regions,
Trailer Source defaulted on its payments, and Regions sued Trailer Source to obtain
possession of the collateral. Pursuant to writs of possession granted by the trial court, on
September 18, 2003, Regions took possession of the certificates of title and cash proceeds
held at First Bank. At this time, Trailer Source still owed Hyundai $16 million. Upon
receiving the titles, Regions consented to a sale of 241 of the used trailers that Trailer Source
had previously negotiated to sell to a third party four days earlier (the “September sale”). In
exchange for the certificates of title, Trailer Source gave Regions $120,500 in proceeds from
the sale of the trailers.
On October 7, 2003, Hyundai intervened in the lawsuit between Trailer Source and
Regions and asserted a counterclaim against Regions. Hyundai sought damages and alleged
that Regions violated section 47-9-610 of the Tennessee Code by disposing of the used
trailers in a commercially unreasonable manner. Between November and December of
2003, Regions authorized Trailer Source to sell another 38 trailers for $53,052, and Trailer
Source again released the titles in exchange for the proceeds.
Under section 47-9-611(c)(3)(B) of the Tennessee Code, unless a secured party‟s
security interest is perfected at least ten days before the date of the sale, it is not entitled to
receive notice of the collateral‟s sale. On that basis, the trial court determined that Hyundai
lacked standing to challenge the September sale and dismissed the issues relating to that sale
on summary judgment. Hyundai appealed the trial court‟s ruling, and the Tennessee Court of
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Appeals reversed, holding that Hyundai had standing to challenge the September sale despite
the notice issue.
On remand, the trial court found that (1) by actually possessing the certificates of
title and authorizing Trailer Source to proceed with the sale, Regions had constructive
possession of the trailers sold; (2) Regions had a duty to dispose of the collateral in a
commercially reasonable manner; and (3) the sales were commercially unreasonable. Based
on expert testimony that the trailers were worth $548,950, the trial court awarded Hyundai
$375,398 in damages.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that Regions exercised control
over the sales so that section 47-9-610 of the Tennessee Code applied; however, it reversed
the lower court‟s holding that the disposition was unreasonable. First, the court explained
that the commercially reasonable obligation applies to the interests of debtors and secured
parties. The statute applies when “the debtor [is] in default, and . . . the [secured party] [has]
take[n] some action to dispose of the collateral.” Therefore, the court determined that the
issue was not whether Regions had possession of the collateral, but whether its participation
was necessary to dispose of the trailers. The court answered this question affirmatively,
reasoning that (1) Regions obtained the collateral with an intent to sell it; (2) Regions
considered possession of the certificates of title necessary to dispose of the trailers; (3)
Regions consented to the sales and released the titles in exchange for the proceeds; and (4)
the buyer acknowledged that it would not have purchased the trailers without the certificates
of title.
After determining that the statute applied to the sales, the court then turned to the
question of whether Region‟s failure to appraise the trailers before selling them for such low
prices was commercially unreasonable. The court explained that according to section 47-9627 of the Tennessee Code, a disposition is commercially reasonable if it is made (1) in the
usual manner on any recognized market; (2) at the current market price at the time of the
disposition; or (3) in another manner conforming to reasonable commercial practices for the
type of property. After considering the circumstances facing Regions, the court concluded
that the sales were commercially reasonable under the statute.
Applying section 47-9-627 to the facts of the case, the court first noted that neither
Regions nor Hyundai knew where the trailers were located, making it difficult to have them
appraised. Furthermore, even if located, the court found that appraising 279 trailers would
have been expensive. Second, the court determined that Trailer Source‟s pre-negotiated
sales shifted to the buyer the risk that some of the trailers would be worthless. The buyer
was willing to purchase trailers that it had not seen and would have to locate. Third, through
expert testimony on “ordinary liquidation” value and by comparing the trial court‟s
estimation of the trailers‟ value to the price for which the buyers later sold the trailers, the
court found that the trial court‟s valuation of the trailers was low. The court determined that
the “ordinary liquidation” standard was too high because Regions “was not in a position to
obtain . . . an orderly liquidation of the collateral.”
This ruling sends a stark message to secured parties seeking to dispose of collateral
after a debtor‟s default. First, it is not possession but control and participation that
determine whether a secured party has an obligation to make a commercially reasonable
disposition. Second, what constitutes a commercially reasonable disposition will vary
according to the facts of each case. At the very least, attorneys representing clients in
transactions involving multiple security interests in the same collateral should inform their
clients of these distinctions.
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Attorneys should also take note of the various concerns that arise in disputes
between secured parties and debtors, as opposed to disputes between two or more secured
parties. As the court noted, when a dispute involving the disposition of collateral arises
between a debtor and a secured party, “possession is . . . key since the [secured party] cannot
usually sell what the debtor possesses.” However, when the dispute is between two or more
secured parties, the focus turns to control and participation. In these situations, the duty to
dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner arises if the disposition requires
the secured party‟s approval. If the secured party seeking to dispose of the collateral does
not have actual physical possession and does not wish to be subject to the statutory duty of
commercially reasonable disposition, it should take precautions to ensure that its actions do
not amount to control of the disposition.
Finally, when the duty to dispose of collateral in a commercially reasonable manner
does apply, the disposing party should look at the totality of the circumstances to determine
how to avoid liability. When making this determination, practitioners should consider the
following issues: (1) the nature of the parties involved in the dispute, (2) whether the debtor
or a secured party has actual possession of the collateral, and (3) whether, under the
circumstances, an orderly liquidation is reasonably possible.

SECURITIES
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act applies only to transactions involving
securities traded on domestic exchanges or transactions where the sale of the
securities occurred in the United States. Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869 (2010).
By Luke Archer
In Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., the Supreme Court limited the reach of
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, a major anti-securities fraud provision. For
nearly forty years, federal district and circuit courts had interpreted the provision to apply to
certain transactions in foreign securities made outside the United States. In Morrison, the
Court decided whether section 10(b) applied to securities purchased abroad that were not
listed on a domestic exchange. Relying on the presumption against extraterritorial
application of federal law, the Morrison Court restricted the scope of section 10(b) to
transactions involving securities traded on domestic exchanges or transactions where the sale
of securities occurred within the United States.
The facts of Morrison are straightforward. In 1998, National Australia Bank Ltd.
(“National”), the largest bank in Australia at the time, purchased HomeSide Lending, Inc.
(“HomeSide”), a Florida-based mortgage-servicing company. Although it owned HomeSide,
National‟s common stock was not traded on any exchanges in the United States. From 1998
to 2001, National reported that HomeSide was thriving; however, in late 2001, National
wrote down the value of HomeSide‟s assets by $2.2 billion. National‟s stock value
plummeted.
Three Australians (the “plaintiffs”), who had purchased National stock before the
write-down, sued National in the Southern District of New York for securities fraud under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. National moved to dismiss the suit for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and for failing to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
The district court, finding that section 10(b) did not apply to National‟s conduct, concluded
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that it lacked jurisdiction to decide the case. The Second Circuit affirmed the district court‟s
decision, concluding that the “heart of the alleged fraud” occurred outside the United States.
The Supreme Court affirmed the Second Circuit‟s ruling but rejected two aspects of the
circuit court‟s reasoning.
First, the Court held that the Second Circuit incorrectly dismissed the suit on
jurisdictional grounds when the suit should have been dismissed on the merits. The Second
Circuit dismissed the case after determining that section 10(b) did not apply to National‟s
conduct. The Court held that such a determination was not a jurisdictional question, but a
merits question. Therefore, the proper ground for dismissing the complaint was for failing
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Nevertheless, because the technical
error did not alter anything else about the case, the Court chose not to remand it.
Second, although the Court agreed with the Second Circuit that section 10(b) did
not apply to National‟s conduct, the Court held that the circuit court had applied the
incorrect legal test in coming to its conclusion. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act
bans fraud “by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce . . . or of any
facility of any national securities exchange . . . in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.” In
interpreting section 10(b), the Second Circuit employed a line of reasoning that focused on
the reasonableness of applying section 10(b) to the transaction in question. The majority of
lower courts had used variations of the “reasonableness” analysis for over forty years. The
Second Circuit crafted the parameters of its specific reasonableness analysis with two tests:
“whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon United
States citizens” and “whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States.” The
ambiguous and broad nature of the two tests applied section 10(b) to some sales of foreign
securities made outside of the United States but not to others.
The Court observed
that the tests‟ ambiguity stymied consistent application by leaving ample room for the policy
preferences of individual courts.
The Court rejected the Second Circuit‟s standard by relying on the well-established
presumption against extraterritorial application of federal law. The Court stated that federal
law does not apply outside the United States absent an affirmative indication that Congress
intended for the law to apply abroad.
To defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality, the plaintiffs argued that
Congress in fact intended for section 10(b) to apply to certain foreign transactions, but the
Court rejected their arguments. First, the plaintiffs argued that because section 10(b)‟s
definition of “interstate commerce” references foreign commerce, Congress intended for the
section to apply abroad. The Court was not convinced, stating that the section‟s “general
reference” to foreign commerce did not “defeat the presumption against extraterritoriality.”
Next, the plaintiffs highlighted Congress‟s observation from the Securities Exchange Act
that “prices [of securities] . . . offered in . . . transactions . . . are generally . . . quoted
throughout the United States and foreign countries.” Again, the Court said that such a
“fleeting reference” to price quotations did not overcome the presumption against
extraterritoriality. Lastly, the plaintiffs relied on the following language in section 30(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act: “The provisions [of the Securities Exchange Act] . . . shall not
apply . . . insofar as [any person] transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of
the United States,” unless he does so in violation of SEC regulations “to prevent . . . evasion
of [the Securities Exchange Act].” The Court acknowledged that it is possible to infer from
the language that the Securities Exchange Act may apply overseas; however, the Court,
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relying on the presumption against extraterritoriality, stated that it is more likely that the
language penalizes those who attempt to cover up a domestic violation of the Securities
Exchange Act by acts abroad. Although the Court rejected all the plaintiffs‟ arguments that
Congress intended for section 10(b) to apply outside the United States, the Court asserted
that it was not creating a “clear statement rule,” meaning that its ruling did not necessarily
require all statutes to include an explicit provision that it applied abroad before having
extraterritorial effect.
The Court then applied the presumption against extraterritoriality to the language of
section 10(b) and concluded that the provision reached only transactions involving securities
traded on domestic exchanges or transactions where the sale of securities occurred in the
United States. Section 10(b) bans fraud “in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered.” The
presumption, in part, led the Court to interpret “national securities exchange” to mean
domestic national securities exchanges and to interpret “any security not so registered” to
include only securities sold within the United States. The Court noted that the Securities
Exchange Act focuses not on where the deception occurred but on “purchases and sales of
securities in the United States.” Because National‟s stock was not traded on a domestic
exchange and because the plaintiffs had not bought National‟s stock in the United States, the
Court dismissed the suit. The fact that the fraud stemmed from an alleged bolstering of a
Florida company‟s success made no difference.
Morrison is important to transactional attorneys in three ways. First, the case clearly
defines the scope of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. Before Morrison, federal
circuit and district courts were inconsistent in applying section 10(b) to various foreign
securities. Now, the Court has given a straightforward rule: section 10(b) simply does not
cover transactions concerning securities absent from domestic exchanges when those
securities were not sold within the United States. Second, Morrison further strengthened the
presumption against extraterritoriality of federal law. Attorneys working for corporations
who do business abroad should use the presumption to their clients‟ advantage. Before
determining whether an international corporation‟s practices are following the letter of the
law in the United States, a shrewd attorney should determine whether the letter of the law
even governs the corporation‟s practices. If the regulation applies, the corporation benefits;
if it does not apply, purchasers of foreign securities, like the plaintiffs in Morrison, have no
recourse in the United States for securities fraud. Lastly, Morrison serves as a reminder that
although the rules on securities fraud in the United States may now be clearly defined,
attorneys must still be aware of the reach of any similar foreign securities regulation. Just
because section 10(b) may not apply to certain conduct does not mean that a corporation
escapes liability in other countries.
The two-year limitations period for a private section 10(b) action begins to run when
the plaintiff actually discovers “the facts constituting the violation” or when a
“reasonably diligent plaintiff would have discovered” such facts. Merck & Co. v.
Reynolds, 130 S. Ct. 1784 (2010).
By Dora Misciagna
In Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, the United States Supreme Court addressed the
timeliness of a private securities-fraud action under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(1), a securities fraud complaint is timely if filed no
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more than “[two] years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation” or five
years after the violation, whichever comes first. In Merck, the Supreme Court held that the
two-year limitations period for a private section 10(b) action begins to run when the plaintiff
actually discovers “the facts constituting the violation” or when a “reasonably diligent
plaintiff would have discovered” such facts, whichever takes place first. The Supreme Court
further held that the “facts constituting the violation” include those demonstrating scienter
or fraudulent intent.
In Merck, a group of investors (the “plaintiffs”) brought a section 10(b) claim against
Merck & Co. (“Merck”) alleging that Merck “knowingly misrepresented the risks of heart
attacks” associated with the use of Merck‟s painkiller, Vioxx, which lead to economic losses
when the public discovered the risks associated with the drug. Merck developed Vioxx in
the 1990s. After developing the drug, Merck conducted a study (the “VIGOR Study”)
comparing Vioxx with naproxen, another pain-killing drug. The VIGOR Study revealed that
Vioxx users were approximately four times more likely to suffer heart attacks. In March of
2000, Merck announced the results of the VIGOR Study, acknowledging the adverse
cardiovascular data. However, Merck attributed the adverse findings “to the absence of a
benefit conferred by naproxen rather than due to a harm caused by Vioxx.” This theory
later became known as the “naproxen hypothesis” (the “Naproxen Hypothesis”).
Public debate regarding the Naproxen Hypothesis continued throughout 2001.
Then, in May of 2001, a group of plaintiffs filed a products-liability lawsuit against Merck
regarding the adverse cardiovascular risks associated with Vioxx. In September of 2001, the
Food and Drug Administration (the “FDA”) released a warning letter to the public stating
that Merck‟s Vioxx marketing was “false, lacking in fair balance, or otherwise misleading.”
While the warning letter acknowledged that the Naproxen Hypothesis was a “possible
explanation” for the adverse results, the FDA determined that Merck had promoted the
Naproxen Hypothesis without adequately acknowledging that Vioxx, the drug itself, could
have caused the adverse cardiovascular effects and ordered Merck to send a corrective letter
to healthcare providers. Merck ultimately withdrew Vioxx from the market in September of
2004, claiming that it did so based on the results of a new study. Shortly after, internal
Merck emails were released to the public, demonstrating that Merck “fought forcefully for
years to keep safety concerns from destroying the drug‟s commercial prospects.”
The plaintiffs filed their complaint on November 6, 2003, alleging that Merck “had
defrauded investors by promoting the naproxen hypothesis, knowing the hypothesis was
false.” Merck moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting that the complaint did not fall
within the applicable limitations period because, while the complaint was clearly filed within
the five-year limitations period of § 1658(b)(1), the plaintiffs knew or should have known
“the facts constituting the violation” more than two years earlier. The United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey granted the motion, holding that the plaintiffs‟
complaint was untimely because the FDA‟s warning letter and Merck‟s response put them
on “inquiry notice”—i.e., they possessed information that would cause a reasonably diligent
plaintiff to investigate further—more than two years prior to filing their complaint. The
Third Circuit reversed, holding that the information available more than two years before the
plaintiffs filed their complaint did not commence the running of the limitations period
because it did not suggest scienter, a necessary element of a section 10(b) claim.
After granting Merck‟s petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court affirmed the Third
Circuit‟s decision and held that the plaintiffs‟ complaint was timely. The Supreme Court first
addressed whether, under § 1658(b)(1), “discovery” encompassed not only when a plaintiff
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actually discovered “the facts constituting the violation” but also when a reasonably diligent
plaintiff would have discovered such facts. The Court noted that in the context of
limitations periods, courts have long interpreted the term “discovery” to include the
“reasonably diligent plaintiff” standard and concluded that in adopting § 1658, Congress
intended “discovery” to be interpreted in the same manner.
The Court then addressed Merck‟s argument that the plaintiffs‟ claims accrued more
than two years before they filed their complaint. First, the Court determined that the
limitations period does not begin to run until facts related to scienter become discoverable.
In support of this determination, the Court noted that scienter is an important and necessary
element of a section 10(b) violation and that special heightened pleading requirements
required a section 10(b) plaintiff to set forth facts in the complaint demonstrating that it is
“at least as likely as” not that the defendant acted with scienter. As a result, the Court
concluded that the limitations period cannot commence until such facts become
discoverable.
Next, the Court dismissed Merck‟s argument that, even if “discovery” required
scienter-related facts, facts demonstrating a materially false or misleading statement were
sufficient to demonstrate scienter as well. The Court acknowledged that facts demonstrating
a materially false or misleading statement normally do show scienter but concluded that
additional facts may be necessary in certain circumstances. The Court then addressed
Merck‟s argument that the claim was untimely because the plaintiffs were on “inquiry
notice” more than two years before filing the complaint. As defined by Merck, “inquiry
notice” refers to the point at which the facts would cause a reasonably diligent plaintiff “to
conduct a further inquiry.” The Court reasoned that such a point does not necessarily occur
after a plaintiff would have discovered “the facts constituting the violation” and that
according to § 1658, private section 10(b) actions accrue “only after the „discovery‟” of such
facts. As a result, the Court concluded that “inquiry notice” does not commence the
running of the limitations period for a private section 10(b) action.
Finally, the Court addressed Merck‟s argument that the plaintiffs discovered or
should have discovered facts relating to scienter more than two years before filing the
complaint. Merck based its argument on the following incidences: (1) the FDA‟s September
2001 warning letter stating that Merck had “minimized” the “potentially serious
cardiovascular findings” of the VIGOR Study and (2) the products-liability complaints, filed
in 2001, alleging that Merck “omitted, suppressed, or concealed material facts concerning the
dangers and risks associated with Vioxx.” Noting that the FDA even described the
Naproxen Hypothesis as a “possible explanation” for the VIGOR Study‟s findings, the
Court concluded that the FDA‟s warning letter showed little or no evidence that Merck
promoted the Naproxen Hypothesis with fraudulent intent. The Court further concluded
that the products-liability complaints revealed little more with regard to scienter because they
alleged only in general terms that Merck concealed information concerning Vioxx and
“purposefully downplayed and/or understated the serious nature of the risks associated with
Vioxx.” As a result, the Court concluded that prior to November 6, 2001—two years before
the plaintiffs filed their complaint—the plaintiffs had not discovered and a reasonably
diligent plaintiff would not have discovered “the facts constituting the violation.” Thus, the
plaintiffs‟ claim fell within the applicable limitations period.
The Court‟s decision in Merck will likely increase the number of section 10(b)
complaints that fall within the two-year limitations period of § 1658(b)(1). Prior to Merck,
many jurisdictions applied a form of the “inquiry notice” standard applied by the district
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court in this case. Under this standard, events occurring outside of the two-year limitations
period that would cause a reasonably diligent plaintiff to investigate further but that did not
necessarily demonstrate fraudulent intent could trigger the two-year statute of limitations.
Now, defendants must establish that the plaintiff knew of facts demonstrating scienter or
that such information was publicly available. As a result of this heightened standard, the
two-year statute of limitations defense will not be as useful. On the other hand, in holding
that the facts in Merck did not demonstrate sufficient evidence of scienter to commence the
running of the statute of limitations, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a section 10(b)
plaintiff must allege scienter with the requisite specificity and that facts demonstrating a
materially false or misleading statement do not necessarily meet this burden.

SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
When a shareholder receives shares of an acquiring corporation as consideration in a
merger, the shareholder’s derivative action against the acquired company may still
exist as a double derivative action. Lambrecht v. O’Neal, 3 A.3d 277 (Del. 2010).
By Mary Elizabeth Anderson
In Lambrecht v. O’Neal, the Supreme Court of Delaware was asked to clarify the
procedural requirements for a shareholder plaintiff who lost standing to bring suit in a
standard corporate derivative claim because of a merger; as a result of the merger, the
plaintiff was a shareholder in the acquiring corporation, and the acquiring corporation was
the parent and 100% owner of the target subsidiary corporation. The court held that
shareholder plaintiffs are not required to show that, at the time of the wrongdoing, they
owned stock in the acquiring corporation nor that the acquiring corporation owned stock in
the target corporation. This decision overruled the Delaware Court of Chancery‟s holding in
Saito v. McCall, No. Civ.A. 17132-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 205, 2004 WL 3029876 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 20, 2004) and provides a different standing requirement for post-merger double
derivative suits than for standard derivate suits.
Lambrecht was before the Delaware Supreme Court as a certified question from the
Southern District of New York where the double derivate suits were initially filed.
Originally, Lambrecht and Loveman (the “plaintiffs”) filed separate standard derivative
actions against Merrill Lynch‟s board of directors claiming breach of fiduciary duties for
underwriting collateralized debt obligations, discarding the risks of mortgage investments,
and paying $3.6 billion in employee bonuses. In January 2009, Merrill Lynch and Bank of
America (“BofA”) (collectively, the “defendants”) closed a reverse triangular merger where
Merrill Lynch, the target corporation, became a wholly owned subsidiary of BofA, the
acquiring corporation, and BofA became the parent corporation and 100% owner of Merrill
Lynch. As consideration for the merger, Merrill Lynch shares were converted to BofA
shares. Because the plaintiffs‟ shares were converted to BofA shares, the plaintiffs lost
standing to bring standard derivative suits against Merrill Lynch under Lewis v. Anderson, 477
A.2d 1040 (Del. 1984). As a result, the plaintiffs‟ cases were dismissed without prejudice. In
response, the plaintiffs amended their cases to double derivative suits in order to force
BofA‟s board of directors into action against Merrill Lynch‟s board of directors to correct
the wrongdoing. Relying on Saito v. McCall, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs‟
actions for lack of standing and argued that the plaintiffs must show that, at the time of the
wrongdoing, both BofA and the plaintiffs owned stock in Merrill Lynch and that the
plaintiffs also owned stock in BofA.
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In answering the certified question, the Delaware Supreme Court first analyzed the
different types of derivative actions. The court noted that a standard derivative action
occurs when a shareholder brings a claim on behalf of the corporation in which the
shareholder owns stock, either because its board wrongfully refuses to act or is incapable of
making an impartial decision. In a double derivative action, however, the shareholder of the
parent corporation brings a lawsuit on behalf of its subsidiary because the subsidiary has
harmed the parent corporation and thus the parent corporation‟s shareholders. The court
went on to note that double derivative actions have an additional twist that relates to the
parent-subsidiary relationship and the time of the wrongdoing. If the shareholder owns
stock in the parent corporation, and the parent-subsidiary relationship was created before
the time of the alleged wrongdoing, then the shareholder can only bring a double derivative
lawsuit. But, if the shareholder has stock in the parent corporation only as a result of a
merger, and the wrongdoing occurred before the merger, then the shareholder may be able
to bring a standard derivative suit pre-merger and a double derivative suit post-merger, if the
correct procedural requirements are met.
Second, the court discussed what standing requirement should apply to double
derivative actions. In a standard derivative suit, plaintiffs must satisfy a contemporaneous
and continuous ownership standing from the time of the wrongdoing and throughout the
entire litigation. The court observed that title 8, section 327 of the Delaware Code sets the
contemporaneous ownership condition and requires a shareholder plaintiff bringing a claim
on behalf of a corporation to be a shareholder of that corporation at the time of the
wrongdoing. The Delaware Supreme Court‟s decision in Lewis v. Anderson set the
requirement that plaintiffs must hold the shares continuously throughout litigation (the
“Lewis test”).
The court next looked to Blasband v. Rales, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993), a double
derivative case where the United States District Court for the District of Delaware certified a
question regarding demand excusal to the Delaware Supreme Court. In Rales, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that for demand excusal of the parent board in a double derivative
action, plaintiffs must follow the Rales test rather than the Lewis test. Unlike the Lewis test,
which sets the requirements at the time of the wrongdoing, the Rales test is applied at the
time the complaint is filed. The court also held that the plaintiff must satisfy the Lewis test
for the subsidiary‟s board but that the Rales test applies to the parent board. In Lambrecht,
the timing requirement between Lewis and Rales is an important distinction for the different
types of derivative actions.
Next, the court turned to the defendants‟ proposed standing requirement for postmerger double derivative actions and found the defendants‟ argument fatally flawed. The
defendants claimed that double derivative lawsuits are like two standard derivative lawsuits
stacked on top of each other and that each action must satisfy the Lewis test. Thus, the
defendants argued that the plaintiffs must show that they owned BofA stock before the
merger and at the time of the Merrill Lynch wrongdoing and that BofA must have also
owned Merrill Lynch stock at the time of the wrongdoing. The court rejected this argument
for four reasons.
First, the court recognized that aside from the Saito decision, there was no other
case law or statutory law in Delaware that proposed requirements for the standing of
defendants in double derivative suits. If the court followed Saito, then double derivative
suits would be “virtually impossible to bring except in bizarrely happenstance
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circumstances.” The court declared that such an interpretation would negate old precedent
that encouraged double derivative actions.
Second, the court rejected the defendants‟ proposal that, in order to bring a claim,
BofA had to be a shareholder of Merrill Lynch at the time of the wrongdoing. The court
explained that, post-merger, BofA was the sole owner of Merrill Lynch including all claims;
therefore, BofA had the ability to act directly and did not have to follow the derivative
requirements.
Third, the court rejected the defendant‟s application of the contemporaneous
requirement in title 8, section 327 of the Delaware Code. The court asserted that the
plaintiffs in this double derivative action were bringing a claim on behalf of BofA. Thus, the
plaintiffs only had to show they were BofA shareholders at the time the claim was brought,
not at the time of the wrongdoing. The court determined that this requirement was easily
met because the plaintiffs acquired BofA shares in the merger and brought the claim postmerger.
Fourth, the court determined that a post-merger double derivative action is not a de
facto continuation of the pre-merger derivative action. The court found that standing to
bring a double derivative action instead rests on the fact that the acquiring corporation,
BofA, failed to act and correct the original wrong. It was that failure to act, not the original
failure, that allows shareholders to bring a double derivative action. The court concluded
that if BofA‟s board had corrected the wrongdoing, the plaintiffs could not have brought a
double derivative action.
Finally, the court turned to the Saito decision and held that it misapplied Delaware
law because it extended a standard derivative requirement to a double derivative action. In
Saito, the court held that to have standing to sue in a double derivative action the plaintiff
must follow the Lewis test rather than the Rales test. The Lambrecht court rejected the
Delaware Court of Chancery‟s holding in Saito and clarified that while a standard derivative
action must follow the Lewis test, a double derivative action must follow the Rales test.
There are three reasons this case is significant to transactional lawyers. First, this
case helps transactional lawyers representing shareholders by clarifying and lowering the
requirements for standing to bring a post-merger double derivative action. Now, a
shareholder is able to pursue a claim that was dismissed for lack of standing as a result of a
merger. Second, this case warns the acquiring corporation‟s transactional lawyers to
structure the merger and consideration to prevent a double derivative action. Transactional
lawyers must be aware that a merger with a share-for-share exchange will not terminate the
target shareholder‟s standing for a claim against the target corporation. The acquiring
corporation needs to be prepared to shield itself from this potential litigation or avoid the
acquisition until this litigation has been resolved. Third, this case is a reminder that all
transactional lawyers must understand the different types of derivative actions and their
standing requirements because each action‟s rules are vastly different.

